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ABSTRACT 
Markets have long been used as benchmarks for economic 
value in various areas of law.  However, a crucial question has 
received less than adequate attention: what type of market 
should be used in the market benchmark?  More specifically, 
given all the imperfections one typically finds in day-to-day 
markets, how perfect does a market have to be in order to 
qualify as a benchmark for economic value?  This Article 
discusses this question using countervailing duty law as a case 
study.  Countervailing duty law allows the United States to 
impose countervailing duties on imported merchandise to offset 
subsidies conferred by foreign governments upon such 
merchandise.  In identifying and measuring subsidies, 
countervailing duty law utilizes a market benchmark, i.e., 
whether the government action under investigation is on terms 
more favorable than those available in the market.  After 
tracing the evolution of the market benchmark analysis in 
countervailing duty law, I demonstrate that the market 
benchmark analysis, as currently formulated in countervailing 
duty law, envisions a perfect or near-perfect market, i.e., a 
market that is undistorted by the government action under 
investigation.  I further demonstrate the pitfalls of this perfect-
market approach by critiquing the basis on which a market is 
rejected as distorted, the manner in which alternative 
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benchmarks are selected, and the fundamental disconnect 
between the perfect-market approach and the purpose of 
countervailing duty law. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The assessment of economic value figures prominently in 
law.  In almost every area of law, after all rights are ascertained 
and all wrongs assigned, redress entails compensating the 
wronged party in accordance with a judicially or legislatively 
determined economic value of the damages in question.  In 
certain areas of law, not only does the assessment of economic 
value provide a measure of damages, but this assessment 
defines the substantive rights the law protects in the first 
instance.  The law of eminent domain, for example, assesses the 
economic value of the property being condemned by the 
government in order to arrive at the amount of just 
compensation the government is required to pay to the owner of 
the property.1  As has been argued convincingly elsewhere, the 
choice of a valuation mechanism for takings compensation 
purposes implicates not only the extent of a property owner’s 
recovery but more importantly the substantive constitutional 
rights afforded to property owners against government takings.2 
Although there are different schools of thought on the 
theory of economic value, the one that has gained the widest 
acceptance equates economic value with exchange value or 
market value.3  In this view, intrinsic economic value does not 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 4. 
 2. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just 
Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 678 (2005) (“Valuing 
just compensation turns out to be largely unstudied but essential for defining the 
extent of constitutional protection for private property.”). 
 3. This notion of economic value is called “value in exchange” by Adam Smith, 
often considered the founder of modern economics.  Smith contrasted “value in 
exchange” with “value in use” as follows: 
The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no 
value in exchange; and on the contrary, those which have the greatest 
value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use.  Nothing is 
more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce any thing; scarce any 
thing can be had in exchange for it.  A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce 
any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently 
be had in exchange for it. 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & CARL E. WALSH, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 70 (4th ed. 
2006) (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1976), Book One, Chapter 
IV). 
Besides “value in exchange” and “value in use,” another notion of economic value 
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exist; the value of a good or service is nothing but the price it 
would fetch in the market, determined by the subjective 
valuation of buyers and sellers.4  The market, according to this 
view, is the only yardstick against which value should be 
measured. 
Similarly, using markets as benchmarks for economic value 
has been a routine practice in law.  Returning to the eminent 
domain example, the default measure of the amount of “just 
compensation” the government is required to pay to the owner of 
the condemned property has been held to be the “fair market 
value” of the property.5  Other examples of the use of market 
benchmarks in law abound.6 
However, the markets one typically finds in the day-to-day 
world may not all possess the same qualities as those of the 
perfect market contemplated in standard economics textbooks.7  
 
is the labor theory of value.  The labor theory of value, first espoused by David 
Richardo and later fully developed by Karl Marx, assumes that what gives value to a 
commodity is the total quantity of labor required for its production.  See PAUL A. 
SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 679, 714–15 (McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
1995) (1948). 
Of all the different notions of economic value, exchange value has since become 
the building block of modern economics thanks to the works of neoclassical or 
marginalist economists.  Neoclassical economists showed that demand depends upon 
marginal utility and thereby provided the missing link in a complete theory of the 
market mechanism.  See id. at 534–37. 
 4. See Henry W. Stuart, Subjective and Exchange Value, 4 J. OF POL. ECON. 
208, 210 (1896) (“The whole process of the determination of exchange value is, as 
[the Austrian school economists] maintain, from beginning to end a psychological 
one, and the elements in this process are the subjective valuation of both the buyers 
and the sellers, in terms of marginal utility.”). 
 5. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943); accord. City of New 
York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 
365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961); Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973). 
 6. See, e.g., Janis v. Comm’r, 469 F.3d 256, 263 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that 
the fair market value of a property on the date of an individual’s death determines 
the cost basis to his heirs when the income tax due on its subsequent sale is 
calculated); Kanematsu-Gosho Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 814 F.2d 115, 118–19 
(2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the presumptive measure of damages in a suit brought 
under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is the difference between the fair market 
value of the goods at their destination in the condition in which they should have 
arrived and the fair market value in the condition in which they actually did arrive). 
But see United States v. Shugart, 176 F.3d 1373, 1375–76 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that replacement cost is a better measure of value than fair market value under 18 
U.S.C. § 3663A when actual cash value is difficult to ascertain); Ex parte Barron 
Services, Inc., 874 So.2d 545, 551 (Ala. 2003) (holding that the fair value of the stock 
of a close corporation should not be equated with the company’s fair market value). 
 7. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 271 (“Our discussion [of the 
invisible-hand theory] has proceeded on the basis of some unrealistic assumptions: 
no monopolies, no spillovers or externalities, no government policy failures, and so 
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Price (and thus market value) is an outcome of the supply and 
demand conditions of a market, and different market conditions 
invariably lead to different prices (and thus different market 
values).  For example, the sale price reached in a transaction in 
which the seller faces impending financial troubles will very 
likely be different from the sale price reached in a transaction in 
which the seller is unpressured.  Therefore, when using markets 
as benchmarks for economic value, a question arises as to what 
type of market should be used.  More specifically, how perfect 
does a market have to be in order to qualify as a benchmark for 
economic value? 
To some degree, the question of what type of market is to be 
used as the market benchmark is more revealing than the 
question of whether to use the market benchmark in the first 
place.  Market price is often the default choice for a value 
benchmark, and that choice usually requires no justification 
unless and until the law is forced to choose among different 
types of markets for the market benchmark.  When choosing 
among different types of markets, the law must identify and 
scrutinize the underlying purpose for which the market 
benchmark is utilized before making a decision as to what type 
of market best suits that purpose. 
This Article examines how that decision is made—and the 
pitfalls associated with that decision in one particular area of 
the law: countervailing duty law.8  As a major component of 
trade remedy laws, countervailing duty law provides remedies 
against subsidies conferred by foreign governments on imported 
merchandise.9  In the United States, the United States 
Department of Commerce (DOC) and the United States 
International Trade Commission (ITC) administer 
countervailing duty law.  The DOC determines the existence 
and magnitude of countervailable subsidies,10 whereas the ITC 
determines whether subsidized imports cause material injury or 
 
forth.”). 
 8. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671–1671h (2000). 
 9. See id. § 1671(a) (“If the administering authority determines that the 
government of a country or any public entity within the territory of a country is 
providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy with respect to the 
manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind of merchandise imported, or 
sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States, . . . then there shall 
be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other 
duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy.”); see also 
David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in 
the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, 11 (1995) (explaining how U.S. 
countervailing duties function as checks on foreign subsidies in international trade). 
 10. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1); Gantz, supra note 9, at 27. 
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threats of material injury to U.S. industries.11  Upon petition by 
domestic producers and affirmative government findings with 
respect to subsidy and injury, countervailing duty law allows 
the imposition of countervailing duties equal to the amount of 
the net subsidy conferred.12  At the international level, the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) govern 
countervailing duty laws.13 
Governments give subsidies of various fashions to advance 
economic or non-economic goals, sometimes at the expense of 
trading partners.  The adverse effect of subsidies on 
international trade calls for disciplining the use of them.14  
However, not everything that governments do should be 
considered an illegitimate subsidy.  In modern times, 
governments participate or intervene in the economy in a 
myriad of ways.  Governments own natural resources15 and 
corporations,16 provide loans17 or loan guarantees, buy and sell 
 
 11. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2); Gantz, supra note 9, at 28. 
 12. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a). 
 13. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 
I.L.M. 1125 (1994), reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 264, 
268 (World Trade Organization 1995) [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
 14. Under the SCM Agreement, a subsidy must cause adverse effects to the 
interests of other members in order for it to be actionable.  SCM Agreement, art. 5.  
See generally MARC BENITAH, THE LAW OF SUBSIDIES UNDER THE GATT/WTO 
SYSTEM (2001) (analogizing the adverse effect of subsidies on international trade to 
that of pollution in the context of domestic law). 
 15. In the United States, for example, state governments own natural 
resources within three nautical miles of the coastline, while the federal government 
owns natural resources seaward of state coastal waters.  See Elizabeth A. Ransom, 
Wind Power Development on the United States Outer Continental Shelf: Balancing 
Efficient Development and Environmental Risks in the Shadow of the OCSLA, 31 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 465, 474 (2004). 
 16. Government-owned corporations are common even in Western countries.  
For a history of state-owned-enterprises in Western countries, see PIER ANGELO 
TONINELLI, The Rise and Fall of Public Enterprise: The Framework, in THE RISE AND 
FALL OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 3 (Pier Angelo Toninelli 
ed., Cambridge University Press 2000).  A recent example of government ownership 
in a major corporation in the United States is the 60% ownership taken by the 
United States federal government in General Motors as part of the latter’s 
government-orchestrated bankruptcy process.  See Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep, 
GM Collapses Into Government’s Arms, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009, at A1. 
 17. For example, the U.S. federal government provides direct student loans 
through the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program and provides student 
loan guarantees through the Federal Family Education Loan Program.  See SAR A. 
LEVITAN ET AL., PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR 202 (8th ed. 2003).  From 1995 
through 2000, the direct loan program provided $72 million in loans to 
postsecondary students and their parents, while the loan guarantee program 
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goods and services in the marketplace,18 and regulate the 
economy through macroeconomic19 and regulatory policies.20  So 
the central task for countervailing duty law is to decide what 
kinds of government actions should be considered subsidies that 
need to be countervailed.  This is where the market benchmark 
comes into play. 
Under countervailing duty law, for a government action to 
be considered a countervailable subsidy, the action must confer 
a benefit on the recipient of the government action.21  In 
determining the existence of a benefit, countervailing duty law 
compares the terms of the government action to the terms 
available in the market.22  A benefit is deemed to exist if the 
terms of a government action are more favorable than those 
available in the market, with the amount of benefit—and thus 
subsidy—being the difference between the government terms 
and the market terms.23 
Using a market benchmark in identifying and measuring 
subsidies becomes more complicated, however, when there are 
allegations that the government has distorted the market by 
virtue of the subsidy under investigation, and the market price 
should not be relied on as the subsidy benchmark.  In the face of 
 
provided more than $300 million in loans over the same period.  Id.  Short-term 
emergency loans are sometimes made by governments in the form of bridge loans to 
companies that are in financial troubles.  One notable example of such bridge loans 
in the United States is the $85 billion loan made by the Federal Reserve to 
insurance giant American International Group in September 2008 at the onset of 
the financial crisis.  See Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced & Mary 
Williams Walsh, Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. 
TIMES, September 17, 2008, at A1. 
 18. The U.S. federal government is, once again, an example: the U.S. federal 
government is the world’s largest buyer of goods and services, with purchases 
totaling more than $425 billion per year.  See U.S. Small Business Administration, 
Contracting Opportunities, http://www.sba.gov/contractingopportunities/index.html 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2009). 
 19. Modern governments routinely employ fiscal and monetary policies to 
achieve macroeconomic goals with respect to unemployment and inflation.  For an 
introduction to governments’ macroeconomic tools, see SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, 
supra note 3, at 381–401. 
 20. According to Samuelson and Nordhaus, government regulations are 
imposed through laws or rules designed to change the behavior of firms.  The major 
kinds of government regulations are economic regulations, which affect the prices, 
entry, or service of a single industry, and social regulations, which attempt to correct 
externalities that prevail across a number of industries.  See id. at 322.  For a more 
detailed discussion of government regulations, see CLARKE E. COCHRAN,  ET AL., 
AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION 53–56 (Michael Rosenberg 9th ed. 
2008). 
 21. SCM Agreement art. 1.1(b), supra note 3, at 264. 
 22. See infra Part II.C. 
 23. See infra Part II.C. 
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such allegations, countervailing duty law has to decide how to 
determine whether a market is distorted, and if it is distorted, 
what type of market should be used in its place as the subsidy 
benchmark. 
This Article discusses how these decisions are made in 
countervailing duty law.  After tracing the evolution of the 
market benchmark in countervailing duty law, I demonstrate 
that countervailing duty law, as currently interpreted by the 
WTO and implemented by the DOC, envisions a perfect or near-
perfect market, i.e., a market that is undistorted by the 
government action under investigation.  I further demonstrate 
the pitfalls of this perfect-market approach by critiquing the 
basis on which the DOC rejects a market as distorted, 
challenging the manner in which the DOC replicates the 
counterfactual perfect market, and identifying a fundamental 
disconnect between the perfect-market approach and the 
purpose of the countervailing duty law. 
This Article studies countervailing duty law, which is one 
example of the misapplication of market benchmark analysis in 
law.  It does not, however, systemically tackle issues with 
market benchmarks that arise in other areas of law.  Although 
the market benchmark analysis—as well as its pitfalls—is a 
common theme running through various areas of law, market 
benchmarks are used differently under different circumstances, 
and the mechanics of various market benchmark analyses 
necessarily vary in different areas of law.  To borrow physics 
parlance, a “string theory” of market benchmark analyses 
simply does not exist. 
That being said, this Article’s analysis of the market 
benchmark in countervailing duty law is nevertheless relevant 
in other market benchmark contexts for the following two 
reasons.  First, the market benchmark analysis in 
countervailing duty law is a prime illustration of the preference 
given to a perfect, yet non-existent, market over an imperfect, 
yet real, market.  To the extent that other areas of law look to 
perfect markets as the benchmark for economic value, the 
lessons learned from countervailing duty law will prove useful.  
Second, the two types of markets countervailing duty law 
chooses between for its market benchmark analysis are perhaps 
as far apart as could be: one entails significant government 
intervention, while the other does not.  In the face of the recent 
global financial crisis, governments worldwide have an 
unprecedented stake in their economies, and government 
intervention in many market sectors is only expected to grow.  
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009  8:57 AM 
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As a result, it is conceivable that in certain areas of law the 
propriety of using a market as a benchmark for economic value, 
which may have been taken for granted so far, will come under 
renewed scrutiny now that the markets are seeing persistent 
government intervention.  The lessons learned from 
countervailing duty law regarding the choice between a market 
with government intervention and a market without may prove 
useful for other areas of law as these areas respond to evolving 
circumstances. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE MARKET BENCHMARK 
ANALYSIS IN COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW 
If the market traditionally has been presumed to be the 
default benchmark for economic value in certain areas of the 
law, that has not been the case in countervailing duty law 
historically.  As evident from the discussions below, the 
acceptance of a market benchmark in countervailing duty law 
has a long, tortuous history.  The history of the adoption of the 
market benchmark in countervailing duty law reveals the 
rationale offered for the market benchmark. 
A.  1890–1978: THE EARLY YEARS 
Congress enacted the first countervailing duty provision in 
the Tariff Act of 189024 in response to the “bounties” granted by 
several European nations on exports of beet sugar.25  In 1897, 
the countervailing duty provision generally applied to all export 
subsidies on all products.26  The Tariff Act of 1922 further 
expanded the reach of countervailing duty law to both export 
and domestic subsidies.27  None of these early countervailing 
duty provisions, however, defined the government measures 
that would fall within the meaning of the term bounty. 
The statutory framework of modern countervailing duty law 
was laid out in the Tariff Act of 1930,28 which, similar to earlier 
countervailing duty provisions, provided for the imposition of 
 
 24. See Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 237, 26 Stat. 584. 
 25. See 30 Cong. Rec. 2203 (1897) (remarks of Sen. Gray) (discussing Wilson 
Bill of 1894). 
 26. See Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205. 
 27. The Tariff Act of 1922 makes the countervailing duty provisions applicable 
to subsidies not only on the exportation of merchandise, but also on the manufacture 
or production of merchandise.  See Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 858, 
935; see also S. REP. NO. 67-595, 2d Sess. 250–51 (1922). 
 28. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). 
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countervailing duties to offset any “bounty or grant” paid or 
bestowed upon the imports under investigation.29  Like previous 
countervailing duty legislation, however, the Tariff Act of 1930 
did not define the meaning of the phrase “bounty or grant.”  Nor 
did it include any criteria for identifying and measuring 
“bounties or grants.”30 
The adoption of the multilateral trading regime, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),31 in 1947 did 
not alleviate the problems stemming from this lack of definition.  
The GATT allows member countries to impose countervailing 
duties on imported merchandise to offset a subsidy determined 
to have been granted on the manufacture, production, or export 
of such merchandise,32 and it requires member countries to 
provide notification of any subsidy that operates to increase 
exports or reduce imports.33  But nowhere in the GATT is the 
term “subsidy” defined.34 
B.  1979–1993: THE ADVENT OF THE MARKET BENCHMARK 
Since its adoption in 1947, the GATT was expanded by a 
series of additional agreements reached in subsequent trade 
negotiating rounds conducted under the auspices of the GATT.35  
Of those GATT negotiating rounds, the Tokyo Round (1973–
1979) focused on subsidies and resulted in the Agreement on the 
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1979, commonly 
known as the “Subsidies Code.”36 
The Subsidies Code represents a significant step in 
strengthening multilateral discipline on the use of subsidies and 
countervailing measures in world trade.37  However, like the 
 
 29. See id. § 1303(a)(1). 
 30. See id. § 1303. 
 31. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 32. See id. pt. 1, art. VI.3. 
 33. See id. pt. 1, art. XVI.1. 
 34. See id.; see also GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JOANNA SHELTON ERB, 
SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 12–13 (1984). 
 35. See World Trade Organization, The GATT Years: from Havana to 
Marrakesh, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2009). 
 36. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204 
[hereinafter Subsidies Code]. 
 37. Among the many achievements of the Subsidies Code is the requirement of 
an injury test before a countervailing measure could be imposed.  See id. art. 4(4), at 
212. 
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previous GATT provisions, the Subsidies Code also lacks a clear 
definition of what exactly constitutes a subsidy.  To be sure, the 
Subsidies Code provides an “Illustrative List of Export 
Subsidies,”38 but that list, as its name suggests, is only 
illustrative and not exhaustive.  In terms of domestic subsidies, 
the Subsidies Code also provides an example list of “possible 
forms of such subsidies,”39 but falls short of declaring that those 
domestic subsidies would be actionable.40 
Congress implemented the Subsidies Code by enacting the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979,41 which added new sections to 
the Tariff Act of 1930.42  The new set of countervailing duty 
provisions provides a non-exhaustive list of subsidies through 
incorporating by reference the Illustrative List of Export 
Subsidies contained in the Subsidies Code.43  The Act also 
provides its own “Illustrative List of Domestic Subsidies.”44 
From the Illustrative List of Domestic Subsidies emerged 
the prototype for what would later become the basis for 
identifying and measuring subsidies in countervailing duty law: 
the market benchmark.  The Illustrative List of Domestic 
Subsidies in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 includes: 
(i.) the provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees 
on terms inconsistent with commercial 
considerations; 
(ii.) the provision of goods or services at preferential 
rates; 
(iii.) the grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover 
operating losses sustained by a specific industry; 
 
 38. See id. Annex: Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, at 240. 
 39. Id. art. 11(3).  The domestic subsidies enumerated in Art. 11(3) of the 
Subsidies Code are: “government financing of commercial enterprises, including 
grants, loans or guarantees; government provision or government financed provision 
of utility, supply distribution and other operational or support services or facilities; 
government financing of research and development programmes; fiscal incentives; 
and government subscription to, or provision of, equity capital.”  Id. 
 40. See id. art. 11(4). 
 41. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144. 
 42. See generally 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671–1677 (West 1980).  The new provisions 
were applicable only to signatories of the Subsidies Code and countries that had 
accepted equivalent obligations.  Previous countervailing duty provisions, contained 
in section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, still applied to countries that were not 
members of the GATT and did not accept the obligations under the Subsidies Code.  
See 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).  The two sets of countervailing duty provisions, 
however, share the same definition of subsidy: the new set of countervailing duty 
provisions defines subsidy as “hav[ing] the same meaning as the term ‘bounty or 
grant’ as that term is used in [section 303 of Tariff Act of 1930].”  Id. § 1677(5). 
 43. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(i) (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988). 
 44. Id. § 1677(A)(ii). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009  8:57 AM 
2010] PITFALLS OF THE (PERFECT) MARKET BENCHMARK 11 
(iv.) the assumption of any costs or expenses of 
manufacture, production, or distribution.45 
The first item on the list embodies a market benchmark.  
When determining whether the government provision of capital, 
loans, or loan guarantees confers a subsidy, the criterion is 
whether the government provision is consistent with 
commercial considerations.  Logically, if the terms on which 
capital, loans, and loan guarantees are provided by the 
government differ from what would be justified by commercial 
considerations, recipients of such financial transfers must have 
received an advantage.  Otherwise, they would have to turn to 
the private market to seek the same capital, loans, or loan 
guarantees on less favorable terms.  As can be seen in the 
following discussion, this market benchmark would later take 
many different forms, depending on the type of government 
action in question. 
Considered in this light, the third and fourth items on the 
illustrative list can be seen as implicitly adopting the market 
benchmark approach as well.  No entities operating on market 
principles would grant funds or forgive debts to cover the 
operating losses of other entities without a quid pro quo.  The 
“grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses”46 
and the “assumption of . . . costs or expenses of manufacture, 
production, or distribution”47 are therefore considered subsidies 
because, at least in part, they are not actions that would occur 
in the market. 
The embrace of the market benchmark by the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979, however, is incomplete.  The Act 
reserves a place for a competing benchmark, the preferentiality 
benchmark.  The second item on the Illustrative List of 
Domestic Subsidies states that when assessing whether the 
government provision of a good or service constitutes a subsidy, 
the criterion is whether the government provision is at 
“preferential rates.”48  But this provision is silent on a key 
question: preferential to what? 
In 1983,49 the DOC articulated its standard for determining 
 
 45. Id.  This list of domestic subsidies is preceded by a requirement that such 
subsidies be provided to a specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or 
industries to be considered subsidies.  See id.  The specificity requirement is outside 
the scope of this Article and will not be discussed here in detail. 
 46. Id. § 1677(5)(A)(ii)(III). 
 47. Id. § 1677(5)(A)(ii)(IV). 
 48. Id. § 1677(5)(A)(ii). 
 49. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 transferred the authority for 
administering the countervailing duty law from the Department of The Treasury to 
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preferentiality in subsidy investigations involving government 
provisions of goods or services in Certain Softwood Products 
from Canada.50  The DOC stated that preferentiality “normally 
means only more favorable to some within the relevant 
jurisdiction than to others within that jurisdiction”51 and “it 
does not mean ‘inconsistent with commercial considerations.’”52  
In other words, according to the DOC, the standard for 
determining preferentiality is preferential to “others,” not 
preferential to the “market.” 
Despite the co-existence of two seemingly incompatible 
benchmarks under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the DOC, 
in its administration of the countervailing duty statute 
subsequent to the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979, noticeably nudged the balance between the two 
benchmarks in favor of the market benchmark.  As discussed 
below, the DOC shifted the relative weight of the two 
benchmarks through a complete acceptance of the concept of 
market distortion as the raison d’être of countervailing duty law 
when deciding not to apply countervailing duty law to non-
market economy (NME) countries. 
The DOC first confronted the issue of whether a subsidy can 
be found in a NME in Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland in 
1984.53  In that case, steel producers in the United States 
petitioned the DOC to impose countervailing duties on imports 
of carbon steel wire rod from Poland, alleging that steel 
producers and exporters in Poland had received “bounties or 
grants” within the meaning of the countervailing duty statute 
through a variety of government programs.54  The DOC rejected 
the petitioners’ claims, holding that subsidies cannot be 
meaningfully identified and measured in a NME.55  In the 
course of explaining its decision, the DOC ventured a sweeping 
definition of subsidy: 
In a market economy, scarce resources are channeled to their most 
 
the Department of Commerce.  Pub.L. No. 96-39, section 101, 93 Stat. 144, 169-70 
(1979). 
 50. See Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Softwood 
Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24159 (Dep’t of Commerce May 31, 1983). 
 51. Id. at 24167. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing 
Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19374 (Dep’t of Commerce May 7, 1984). 
 54. Id. at 19375. 
 55. Id. at 19374 (“We determine that bounties or grants within the meaning of 
section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act), cannot be found in 
nonmarket economies.”). 
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profitable and efficient uses by the market forces of supply and 
demand.  We believe a subsidy (or bounty or grant) is definitionally any 
action that distorts or subverts the market process and results in a 
misallocation of resources, encouraging inefficient production and 
lessening world wealth. 56 
Under this definition, markets become the ultimate 
criterion for determining whether a subsidy exists.  The DOC 
further elaborated on why markets serve this role: 
In the absence of government intervention, market economies are 
characterized by flexible prices determined through interaction of 
supply and demand.  In response to these prices, resources flow to 
their most profitable and efficient uses.  To identify subsidies in this 
pure market economy, we would look to the treatment a firm or sector 
would receive absent government action.  In the absence of the bounty 
or grant, the firm would experience market-determined costs for its 
inputs and receive a market-determined price for its output.  The 
subsidy received by the firm would be the difference between the 
special treatment and the market treatment.57 
This is the first time the DOC set out, though implicitly, the 
rationale for using the market as the subsidy benchmark.  
According to the DOC, a market allocates resources most 
efficiently.  Furthermore, subsidies cause deviation from the 
market-determined optimum by altering the costs and prices 
faced by firms.  Under this rationale, the market benchmark 
takes on a value judgment.  Not only is the market the only 
alternative to government favoritism, but it is also a virtuous 
 
 56. Id. at 19375 (emphasis added). 
 57. Id.  The DOC went on to state that because resources are not allocated by a 
market in NMEs, “it is obviously meaningless to look for a misallocation of resources 
caused by subsidies.”  Id.  Therefore, the DOC stated, “subsidies have no meaning 
outside the context of a market economy.”  Id.  Note that in 2007, the DOC reversed 
its position of not applying the countervailing duty law to a country officially 
designated as an NME, by finding that China provided countervailable subsidies to 
Chinese producers and exporters of coated free sheet (CFS) paper.  See Coated Free 
Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing 
Duty Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 60645 (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 25, 2007).  
However, the DOC’s decision to find countervailable subsidies in China does not 
signify a change in its view that market distortion is the basis for determining 
subsidies.  The justification offered for applying the countervailing duty law to 
China is not that the countervailing duty law should now be applicable to NMEs, 
but that China is no longer the same type of NME as the one under consideration in 
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland.  See Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia and 
Lawrence Norton, Office of Policy, Import Administration, to David M. Spooner, 
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, for Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from People’s Republic of China (March 
29, 2007) (discussing “Whether the Analytical Elements of the Georgetown Steel 
Opinion are Applicable to China’s Present-Day Economy”), available at 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-sep-rates/prc-cfsp/china-cfs-georgetown-
applicability.pdf. 
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alternative.  Seen in this light, the preferentiality benchmark is 
completely value-neutral.  What matters under the 
preferentiality benchmark is whether the government treats 
individual buyers or users differently, regardless of whether the 
differential treatment has efficiency consequences or 
consequences from the standpoint of any other normative 
standards. 
If the significance of the economic model set out in Carbon 
Steel Wire Rod from Poland is somewhat discounted by the 
narrowness of the context in which it was announced, the DOC’s 
subsequent reiteration of the model is more revealing.  In the 
preamble to the countervailing duty regulations proposed in 
1989,58 the DOC left no doubt that it intended for that economic 
model to be its entire approach to countervailing duty 
regulations.  The DOC opened its introduction to the proposed 
countervailing duty regulations with the following statement: 
Conceptually, the regulations are based upon the economic model 
articulated by the Department in its final determination[] 
in . . . Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland . . . . This model, which 
generally defines a subsidy as a distortion of the market process for 
allocating an economy’s resources, underlies the Department’s entire 
CVD methodology.59 
Because the economic model in Carbon Steel Wire Rod from 
Poland, as analyzed above, calls for the use of the market 
benchmark, it appears that the DOC was suggesting that 
market benchmark analyses are the basis for its entire proposed 
countervailing duty regulations. 
The specific provisions of the proposed 1989 regulations 
largely support this suggestion.  The criteria set forth in the 
proposed regulations for identifying and measuring subsidies in 
a variety of government programs embody the market 
benchmark.60  However, consistent with the Trade Agreement 
 
 58. See Countervailing Duties: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for 
Public Comments, 54 Fed. Reg. 23366 (Dep’t of Commerce May 31, 1989) 
[hereinafter 1989 Proposed CVD Regulations]. 
 59. Id. at 23367 (emphasis added). 
 60. Common to all of these subsidy criteria is the difference between the 
treatment a firm receives from the government and the treatment it receives in the 
market—a hallmark of the market benchmark.  For example, in the case of a 
government grant, a countervailable benefit exists in the amount of the grant, id. at 
23380 (citing proposed rule §355.44(a)), presumably because a grant would never 
have been provided by the market.  In the case of a loan, a countervailable benefit 
exists when the amount paid by a firm for a government loan is less than what the 
firm would pay for a benchmark loan, generally defined as a loan the firm actually 
obtained or would have obtained in the market.  Id. at 23380 (citing proposed rule 
§ 355.44(b)).  In the case of a loan guarantee, a countervailable benefit exists when 
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Act of 1979, the proposed 1989 regulations revert to the 
preferentiality benchmark when determining whether a subsidy 
exists with respect to the government’s provision of goods or 
services.61 
In sum, it appears that the DOC was technically incorrect 
in arguing that the economic model set out in Carbon Steel Wire 
Rod from Poland was the basis for its entire countervailing duty 
methodology.  That economic model calls for the use of the 
market benchmark in identifying and measuring subsidies, yet 
the proposed countervailing duty regulations contain a 
competing benchmark—the preferentiality benchmark.  As 
discussed above, the obstacle posed by the preferentiality 
benchmark to the dominance of the market benchmark is not 
substantial.  Indeed, as discussed below, the last vestiges of the 
preferentiality benchmark completely faded away after a new 
international agreement on subsidies and countervailing 
measures was reached upon the establishment of the WTO. 
C.  AFTER 1994: THE DOMINANCE OF THE MARKET BENCHMARK 
As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations conducted 
between 1986 and 1994, members of the GATT signed twenty 
trade agreements and agreed to transform the GATT into the 
WTO in 1994.62  The Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) was among the 
twenty agreements signed.63 
The SCM Agreement represents a breakthrough in the 
multilateral discipline of subsidies and countervailing 
measures.  One of the greatest accomplishments of the SCM 
Agreement is that it offers a definition of subsidy for the first 
time.64  Under the SCM Agreement, a subsidy exists if: (1) there 
 
the price paid by a firm for the government guarantee is less than what the firm 
would have paid for a comparable commercial guarantee.  Id. at 23381 (citing 
proposed rule § 355.44(c)).  Finally, in the case of an equity infusion, a 
countervailable benefit exists when the market-determined price for equity 
purchased directly from the firm is less than the price paid by the government.  Id. 
at 23381 (citing proposed rule § 355.44(e)). 
 61. The criterion for identifying and measuring a subsidy in the government’s 
provision of goods or services is whether the government provision is at preferential 
rates.  Id. at 23381 (citing proposed rule § 355.44(f)). 
 62. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
 63. SCM Agreement, supra note 13. 
 64. See Terence P. Stewart et al., Opportunities in the WTO for Increased 
Liberalization of Goods: Making Sure the Rules Work for All and that Special Needs 
are Addressed, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 652, 693 (2000). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009  8:57 AM 
16 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol. 19:1 
is a “financial contribution by a government or any public 
body;”65 (2) a “benefit is thereby conferred;”66 and (3) the subsidy 
is “specific to an enterprise or industry or a group of enterprises 
or industries.”67 
Although the term “benefit” is a central element of the 
definition of subsidy, the SCM Agreement does not specify how 
to determine its existence.68  Instead, in Article 14, the SCM 
Agreement offers several “guidelines” on the “calculation of the 
amount of a subsidy in terms of the benefit to the recipient.”69 
 
 65. SCM Agreement, supra note 13, art. 1.1(a)(1). 
 66. Id. art. 1.1(b). 
 67. Id. art. 2.1. 
 68. “Financial contribution” and “specificity” are also important limitations on 
what government actions could be countervailed under the SCM Agreement and 
have each spawned a large body of WTO jurisprudence.  A detailed treatment of the 
financial contribution and specificity requirements is beyond the scope of this Article 
and will not be conducted here. 
 69. Article 14 of the SCM Agreement states:  
Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit to the 
Recipient 
. . . [A]ny method used by the investigating authority to calculate the 
benefit to the recipient . . . shall be consistent with the following guidelines: 
(a) government provision of equity capital shall not be considered as 
conferring a benefit, unless the investment decision can be regarded as 
inconsistent with the usual investment practice (including for the 
provision of risk capital) of private investors in the territory of that 
Member; 
(b) a loan by a government shall not be considered as conferring a 
benefit, unless there is a difference between the amount that the firm 
receiving the loan pays on the government loan and the amount the 
firm would pay on a comparable commercial loan which the firm could 
actually obtain on the market.  In this case the benefit shall be the 
difference between these two amounts; 
(c) a loan guarantee by a government shall not be considered as 
conferring a benefit, unless there is a difference between the amount 
that the firm receiving the guarantee pays on a loan guaranteed by the 
government and the amount that the firm would pay on a comparable 
commercial loan absent the government guarantee.  In this case the 
benefit shall be the difference between these two amounts adjusted for 
any differences in fees; 
(d) the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a 
government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit unless the 
provision is made for less than adequate remuneration, or the 
purchase is made for more than adequate remuneration.  The 
adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to prevailing 
market conditions for the good or service in question in the country of 
provision or purchase (including price, quality, availability, 
marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or 
sale). 
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All four guidelines on identifying and measuring subsidies 
as specified in Article 14 of the SCM Agreement embody a 
market benchmark.  The first three guidelines are 
straightforward.  When determining whether government-
provided equity confers a benefit, the criterion is whether the 
government provision of equity is “inconsistent with the usual 
investment practice . . . of private investors . . . .”70  When 
determining whether a government-provided loan confers a 
benefit, the criterion is whether the borrowing firm pays the 
same amount on the government loan as it “would pay on a 
comparable commercial loan which the firm could actually 
obtain on the market.”71  When determining whether a 
government-provided loan guarantee confers a benefit, the 
criterion is whether the firm receiving the government 
guarantee pays the same amount on the government guarantee 
as it “would pay on a comparable commercial loan absent the 
government guarantee.”72  In each case, the treatment a firm 
receives or would receive in the private market is used as the 
benchmark for judging whether the treatment afforded by the 
government confers a benefit. 
The fourth guideline set forth in Article 14(d) of the SCM 
Agreement is a bit complicated and requires closer analysis.  
When determining whether the government provision (or 
purchase) of goods or services confers a benefit, the criterion is 
whether the government provision (or purchase) is made for less 
than (or more than) “adequate” remuneration.73  Standing alone, 
the term “adequate” is ambiguous in its indication of the nature 
of the benchmark contemplated under it.  The definition begs 
the key question: adequate by what standard?74 
The second sentence of Article 14(d) answers this question.  
Article 14(d) states that when measuring “adequacy of 
remuneration,” the benchmark finally chosen must be “in 
 
SCM Agreement, supra note 13, art. 14. 
 70. Id. art. 14(a). 
 71. Id. art. 14(b). 
 72. Id. art. 14(c). 
 73. Id. art. 14(d). 
 74. Nor does the WTO case law provide a clearer interpretation of the word 
adequate.  In the only WTO case that has addressed Article 14(d) of the SCM 
Agreement so far, the Appellate Body of the WTO stated that “adequate” in the 
context of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement means “sufficient, satisfactory.”  See 
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination 
with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶84, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 
19, 2004).  But as with the term adequate itself, the terms sufficient and satisfactory 
are equally ambiguous as to the criterion by which sufficient and satisfactory are 
judged. 
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relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or service 
in question in the country of provision or purchase.”75  It is clear 
that by referring to “prevailing market conditions,” Article 14(d) 
contemplates a market benchmark, although its language is 
different from what is typically used when describing a market 
benchmark.76 
Following the adoption of the WTO agreements, Congress 
enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) in 1994 to 
bring U.S. trade laws into compliance with the new world trade 
rules under the WTO.77  Among the most notable changes in 
countervailing duty law prompted by the URAA is the addition 
of the definition of subsidy, which in all practical ways tracks 
the language of the definition of subsidy found in the SCM 
Agreement.78  Furthermore, the URAA sets forth a set of 
guidelines for determining the existence of countervailable 
benefits.79  Those guidelines repeat, almost verbatim, the 
 
 75. SCM Agreement, supra note 13, art. 14(d). 
 76. Article 14 of the SCM Agreement proves to be significant not only for what 
it says, but also for what it omits to say, compared with its earlier drafts.  During 
the Uruguay Round negotiations on the SCM Agreement, the earlier drafts of Article 
14 of the SCM Agreement always contained a fifth guideline for calculating the 
amount of a subsidy, after the four guidelines that made their way to the final text.  
The fifth guideline, applicable when the government is the sole provider or 
purchaser of a good or service, states: 
[A]ny method used by the investigating authority to calculate the benefit to 
the recipient . . . shall be consistent with the following guidelines: 
. . . 
(e) When the government is the sole provider or purchaser of the good 
or service in question, the provision or purchase of such good or service 
shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless the government 
discriminates among users or providers of the good or service. 
Discrimination shall not include differences in treatment between 
users or providers of such goods or services due to normal commercial 
considerations. 
Draft Text on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, MTN.GNG/NG10/23, at 15 
(Nov. 7, 1990). 
This draft Article 14(e), if approved, would have preserved a role for the 
preferentiality benchmark under the SCM Agreement.  However, by the time the 
final text of the SCM Agreement was signed, section (e) was deleted from Article 14, 
leaving the market benchmark as the only benchmark standing. 
 77. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 
(1994). 
 78. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(2000). 
 79. The guidelines for identifying countervailable benefits under the SCM 
Agreement are: 
A benefit shall normally be treated as conferred where there is a benefit to 
the recipient, including— 
(i) in the case of an equity infusion, if the investment decision is 
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guidelines found in Article 14 of the SCM Agreement and 
espouse the market benchmark as the only subsidy benchmark. 
To implement the new countervailing duty provisions of the 
URAA, the DOC promulgated a new set of countervailing duty 
regulations in 1998.80  Consistent with the SCM Agreement and 
the URAA, the 1998 countervailing duty regulations adopt the 
market benchmark analysis in identifying and measuring 
subsidies with respect to a variety of government actions, such 
as government provision of grants, loans, loan guarantees, and 
equity.81  When it comes to the government provision of goods or 
services, the 1998 countervailing duty regulations set forth a 
three-tiered hierarchy of benchmarks for determining whether 
the government provides a good or service for less than 
adequate remuneration.  The benchmarks, in order of 
preference, are: (1) market prices from actual transactions 
within the country under investigation; (2) world market prices 
that would be available to purchasers in the country under 
investigation; or (3) an assessment of whether the government 
price is consistent with market principles.82  All three 
benchmarks are market based, seemingly leaving no place for 
 
inconsistent with the usual investment practice of private investors, 
including the practice regarding the provision of risk capital, in the 
country in which the equity infusion is made, 
(ii) in the case of a loan, if there is a difference between the amount the 
recipient of the loan pays on the loan and the amount the recipient 
would pay on a comparable commercial loan that the recipient could 
actually obtain on the market, 
(iii) in the case of a loan guarantee, if there is a difference, after 
adjusting for any difference in guarantee fees, between the amount the 
recipient of the guarantee pays on the guaranteed loan and the 
amount the recipient would pay for a comparable commercial loan if 
there were no guarantee by the authority, and 
(iv) in the case where goods or services are provided, if such goods or 
services are provided for less than adequate remuneration, and in the 
case where goods are purchased, if such goods are purchased for more 
than adequate remuneration. 
For purposes of clause (iv), the adequacy of remuneration shall be 
determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or 
service being provided or the goods being purchased in the country which is 
subject to the investigation or review. Prevailing market conditions include 
price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation, and other 
conditions of purchase or sale. 
Id. § 1677(5)(E). 
 80. See Countervailing Duty; Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 65348 (Dep’t of 
Commerce Nov. 25, 1998) [hereinafter  Preamble to 1998 CVD Regulations]. 
 81. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.511(a) (2008). 
 82. See id. § 351.511. 
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the preferentiality benchmark.83 
However, the text of the SCM Agreement alone does not 
rule out the preferentiality benchmark.  Although the SCM 
Agreement does not have a provision allowing the 
preferentiality benchmark, it does not have a provision 
prohibiting it either.  It was not until the Appellate Body’s 
decision in Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft84 that the Appellate Body made clear that the SCM 
Agreement adopts the market benchmark as the sole 
benchmark for identifying and measuring subsidies.  In that 
case, the Appellate Body of the WTO held that when deciding 
whether a government action confers a benefit within the 
meaning of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, the 
 
 83. However, in the preamble to the 1998 countervailing duty regulations, the 
DOC leaves open the possibility of using the preferentiality benchmark under 
limited circumstances, i.e., when the government is the sole provider of a good or 
service.  The DOC states: 
Where the government is the sole provider of a good or service, and there 
are no world market prices available or accessible to the purchaser, we will 
assess whether the government price was set in accordance with market 
principles through an analysis of such factors as the government’s price-
setting philosophy, costs (including rates of return sufficient to ensure 
future operations), or possible price discrimination.  We are not putting 
these factors in any hierarchy, and we may rely on one or more of these 
factors in any particular case. In our experience, these types of analyses 
may be necessary for such goods or services as electricity, land leases, or 
water, and the circumstances of each case vary widely. 
Preamble to 1998 CVD Regulations, supra note 80, at 65,378 (emphasis added).  
Therefore, the DOC makes it clear that price discrimination—i.e., preferentiality—
may be part of its analysis under a third-tier benchmark.  But the DOC is 
noncommittal about when it will turn to preferentiality, rather than the  other 
factors it says it will consider, in choosing a third-tier benchmark.  The DOC states: 
Although we do not have enough experience with the adequate 
remuneration standard to state when a price discrimination analysis may 
be appropriate, we believe there may be instances where government 
prices are the most reasonable surrogate for market-determined prices. We 
would only rely on a price discrimination analysis if the government good 
or service is provided to more than a specific enterprise or industry, or 
group thereof. 
Id.  Note that this preferentiality benchmark is exactly the concept called for in the 
draft Article 14(e) of the SCM Agreement but rejected in the final text of the SCM 
Agreement.  See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  Apparently, the DOC is 
trying to preserve a role for the preferentiality benchmark, not in its regulations, 
but in the preamble to its regulations, despite the deletion of the same benchmark in 
the final text of the SCM Agreement.  The legal force of a statement in the preamble 
to agency regulations, however, is dubious, and it remains to be seen whether the 
DOC will indeed use preferentiality as a third-tier benchmark. 
 84. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Canada—Aircraft]. 
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appropriate basis for comparison is the marketplace: 
We also believe that the word “benefit”, as used in Article 1.1(b), 
implies some kind of comparison.  This must be so, for there can be no 
“benefit” to the recipient unless the “financial contribution” makes the 
recipient “better off” than it would otherwise have been, absent that 
contribution.  In our view, the marketplace provides an appropriate 
basis for comparison in determining whether a “benefit” has been 
“conferred”, because the trade-distorting potential of a “financial 
contribution” can be identified by determining whether the recipient 
has received a “financial contribution” on terms more favourable than 
those available to the recipient in the market.85 
By reading the market benchmark analysis into the term 
“benefit,” which is a factor in identifying all subsidies, this 
interpretation essentially rules out the preferentiality 
benchmark. 
More than one hundred years after the inception of 
countervailing duty law, the market benchmark has become the 
only officially recognized benchmark for identifying and 
measuring subsidies.  Its triumph over the preferentiality 
benchmark shows countervailing duty law’s reliance on the 
market’s allocative efficiency as a justification for its use as a 
benchmark.  We will return to this justification later when we 
examine how it squares with the purpose of the countervailing 
duty law. 
III.  DEFINING THE MARKET: MARKET-AS-IS VERSUS 
UNDISTORTED MARKET 
As discussed above, under the market benchmark analysis 
in countervailing duty law, if a financial contribution by the 
government is made on terms more favorable than those 
available in the market, then the government will have 
conferred a subsidy.  And the difference between the terms of 
the financial contribution and the terms available in the market 
will be the measurement of the subsidy.  This seemingly simple 
and intuitive formulation of the market benchmark analysis, 
however, masks a far more complicated question: what kind of 
market is the “market” in the market benchmark?  Is it the 
market currently in place in the country under investigation, or 
is it a market free of the influence of the government’s financial 
contribution in question?  The former takes a “market-as-is” 
approach, while the latter takes an “undistorted-market” 
approach.  The two different approaches have starkly different 
 
 85. Id. ¶ 157. 
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implications for the market benchmark analysis.  The market-
as-is approach looks to the actual prices in the existing market, 
regardless of whether the existing market is distorted by 
government subsidies or not.  The undistorted-market approach, 
by contrast, looks to prices that would prevail in an undistorted 
market.  If the existing market happens to be undistorted, then 
actual market prices would be used as benchmarks, but if the 
existing market is considered distorted, that market would be 
discarded in favor of a hypothetical, counterfactual undistorted 
market.  In the analysis below, I demonstrate that 
countervailing duty law adopts the undistorted-market 
approach to the market benchmark analysis. 
A.  UNITED STATES—FINAL COUNTERVAILING DUTY 
DETERMINATION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN SOFTWOOD LUMBER 
FROM CANADA 
The texts of the SCM Agreement, the countervailing duty 
statute, and the countervailing duty regulations give ambiguous 
hints about what kind of market they have in mind when they 
refer to “market” as the subsidy benchmark.  The benchmarks 
utilized under the SCM Agreement, the statute, and the 
regulations for different government actions seem to allow for 
the market-as-is approach, the undistorted-market approach, or 
both.  For example, with respect to government provision of 
equity, the criterion under the SCM Agreement for identifying 
and measuring subsidies is the “usual investment practice” of 
private investors in the exporting country.86  Whether this usual 
investment practice is a practice typically found in an 
undistorted free market is immaterial.  This benchmark, 
therefore, is a market-as-is benchmark.  Furthermore, with 
respect to loans and loan guarantees, the criterion for 
identifying and measuring subsidies under the SCM Agreement 
is whether the recipient of a government-provided loan or loan 
guarantee pays the same amount as it would pay on a 
“comparable commercial” loan or loan guarantee that it “could 
actually obtain on the market.”87  This benchmark could be 
interpreted as a market-as-is benchmark, an undistorted-
market benchmark, or both.  While the phrase “could actually 
obtain on the market” shows that what transpires in the 
existing market will serve as the subsidy benchmark, the phrase 
“comparable commercial” leaves open the possibility that what 
 
 86. SCM Agreement, supra note 13, art. 14(a). 
 87. Id. arts. 14(b) & (c). 
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transpires in the existing market may be rejected as a 
benchmark if it is not deemed “comparable” or “commercial.”  
Finally, the benchmark for government provision or purchase of 
goods or services under the SCM Agreement is “adequate 
remuneration” determined “in relation to prevailing market 
conditions for the good or service in question in the country of 
provision or purchase.”88  Again, this benchmark sends 
conflicting signals.  While the phrase “adequate remuneration” 
does not denote in any meaningful manner the standard by 
which “adequate” is to be judged, the phrase “in relation to 
prevailing market conditions” appears to refer to the market as 
it exists, indicating support for the market-as-is approach. 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the textual 
inconsistency and ambiguity of the SCM Agreement with 
respect to the nature of the market in the market benchmark 
analysis.  That is the backdrop against which the WTO 
Appellate Body ruled in United States—Final Countervailing 
Duty Determination With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber 
from Canada, holding that, at least in the context of Article 
14(d) of the SCM Agreement, the market in the market 
benchmark analysis, as espoused by the SCM Agreement, is an 
undistorted market.89 
Now, a brief introduction to the underlying dispute in that 
case.  The dispute, commonly known as Lumber IV, is the fourth 
iteration of a long-running trade dispute between the United 
States and Canada concerning softwood lumber.90  At the heart 
of the dispute is the way Canada sets the fees charged for 
harvesting timber from government-owned timberland.  In 
Canada, most timber is owned by provincial governments that 
grant timber harvesting rights to integrated softwood lumber 
producers.91  The fees charged for harvesting timber, or the 
“stumpage fees,” are set administratively.92  The United States 
softwood lumber industry alleged, inter alia, that Canada 
 
 88. Id. art. 14(d). 
 89. Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, 
WT/DS257/AB/R (January 19, 2004) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS257/AB/R]. 
 90. For a summary of the history of the U.S.-Canada softwood lumber dispute, 
see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Many Dimensions of Softwood Lumber, 45 ALTA. L. REV. 
319 (2007). 
 91. In Canada, approximately 94% of forests are owned by either federal or 
provincial governments.  See id. at 322 (citing DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: 
RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 130 (2003)). 
 92. See id. 
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provided timber for less than adequate remuneration through 
below-market stumpage fees and thereby conferred 
countervailable subsidies upon Canadian softwood lumber 
producers.93 
In Lumber IV, the DOC applied its three-tiered benchmark 
hierarchy for evaluating adequate remuneration in the 
government provision of goods or services, using stumpage 
prices from the United States as a second-tier benchmark.94  
The DOC first determined that there were no actual market 
prices from within Canada that could serve as a first-tier 
benchmark for Canada’s stumpage fees.95  The DOC based its 
determination on the fact that the Canadian provincial 
governments “constituted a majority or, in certain 
circumstances, a substantial portion of the market.”96  Such 
dominance, according to the DOC, “will distort the market as a 
whole if the government itself does not sell at market-
determined prices.”97  Since “there is substantial evidence that 
Provincial government stumpage fees are not set to reflect 
market prices,” using private stumpage prices as benchmarks 
“would become circular because the benchmark price would 
reflect the very market distortion which the comparison is 
designed to detect.”98  After rejecting Canadian private 
stumpage prices as a first-tier benchmark, the DOC held that 
U.S. stumpage prices are appropriate second-tier benchmarks 
because U.S. stumpage is available to Canadian producers and 
U.S. timber stands are comparable to Canadian timber stands.99  
Accordingly, the DOC used U.S. data as a benchmark for 
comparison to Canadian provincial stumpage fees.100 
Canada filed a request for consultation with the United 
States at the WTO and contested, inter alia, the United States’ 
use of out-of-country stumpage prices as a benchmark for 
 
 93. See id. 
 94. See Issues and Decision Memorandum: Final Results of the Countervailing 
Duty Investigation of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 33–43 (April 
2, 2002) [hereinafter Lumber IV CVD I&D Memo]. 
 95. See id. at 34–38. 
 96. The DOC stated that during the period of investigation, total softwood 
lumber harvested from government-owned timber lands accounted for between 
approximately 83%–99% of all softwood lumber harvested in each of the provinces 
under investigation.  Id. at 35. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 38-43. 
 100. The DOC used selected short-term auction prices for the right to cut 
standing timber on specific tracts of public lands in the United States, id. at 43, or, 
in the case of Québec, prices from private timber sales in Maine.  Id. at 57–59. 
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determining adequacy of remuneration with respect to 
Canadian stumpage.101  Canada’s main argument before the 
dispute settlement panel was textual.  It argued that the phrase 
“in relation to” in Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement means “in 
comparison with,” rather than “taking account of” as advocated 
by the United States,102 and therefore requires the U.S. to use 
“in-country benchmarks” to determine the existence and 
measurement of any alleged benefit.103  The Panel agreed with 
Canada, holding that a strict textual reading of Article 14(d) of 
the SCM Agreement required that “prevailing market 
conditions in the country of provision” be used as the benchmark 
against which to judge the adequacy of the remuneration 
received by the government for the stumpage.104  The Panel 
further held that “as long as there are prices determined by 
independent operators following the principle of supply and 
demand, even if supply or demand are [sic] affected by the 
government’s presence in the market, there is a ‘market’ in the 
sense of Article 14(d) SCM Agreement.”105  Essentially, the 
Panel endorsed the market-as-is approach by upholding any in-
country prices as viable subsidy benchmarks, whether affected 
by government presence or not. 
On appeal by the United States, the Appellate Body 
 
 101. See Request for Consultations by Canada, United States—Final 
Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from 
Canada, WT/DS257/1 (May 13, 2002). 
 102. Panel Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination 
With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/R, ¶ 4.20 
(August 29, 2003) (citing Panel Report, United States—Preliminary Determination 
with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS236/R (Sept. 27, 
2002)). 
 103. Id. ¶ 4.16. 
 104. Id. ¶ 7.48.  The Panel further pointed out that “[t]he text of Article 14 (d) 
SCM Agreement does not qualify in any way the ‘market’ conditions which are to be 
used as the benchmark.”  Id. ¶ 7.51.  As such, the text does not explicitly refer to a 
‘pure’ market, to a market ‘undistorted by government intervention’, or to a ‘fair 
market value’.”  Id. 
 105. Id. ¶ 7.60 (citing Panel Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/1 
(May 13, 2002)). 
While holding a strict textual view of Article 14(d), the Panel was not unaware of 
the economic implications of its view.  The Panel acknowledged that “there could be 
cases in which [government] influence is substantial or even determinative of 
conditions in the private market.”  Id. ¶ 7.58.  In such cases, the Panel said, using 
the prevailing market conditions in the country of provision as the subsidy 
benchmark “would not fully capture the extent of the distortion arising from the 
government financial contribution, a result that in our view would not necessarily be 
the most sensible one from the perspective of economic logic.”  Id.  However, despite 
this concern, the Panel concluded that it would not be appropriate “for this Panel to 
substitute its economic judgment for that of the drafters.”  Id. ¶ 7.59. 
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reversed the Panel’s holding that Article 14(d) of the SCM 
Agreement requires the use of in-country benchmarks for 
determining adequacy of remuneration.106  In so doing, the 
Appellate Body adopted its own textual reading of Article 14(d) 
of the SCM Agreement, rejecting that of the WTO Panel.  The 
Appellate Body first agreed with the Panel that “the text of 
Article 14 (d) [of the] SCM Agreement does not qualify in any 
way the ‘market’ conditions which are to be used as the 
benchmark . . . .”107  However, the Appellate Body held that the 
phrase “in relation to” “has a meaning similar to the phrases ‘as 
regards’ and ‘with respect to’”108  Therefore, the Appellate Body 
said, “the drafters did not intend to exclude any possibility of 
using as a benchmark something other than private prices in 
the market of the country of provision.”109  Instead, 
investigating authorities may use prices other than in-country 
private prices as a benchmark, as long as the chosen benchmark 
“relate[s] or refer[s] to, or [is] connected with” the prevailing 
market conditions in the country of provision.110 
Therefore, it appears that the Appellate Body was arguing 
that Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement allows the use of both 
in-country and out-of-country benchmarks.  However, the two 
benchmarks are not created equal under Article 14(d).  The 
Appellate Body stated that Article 14(d) “emphasize[s] by its 
terms that prices of similar goods sold by private suppliers in 
the country of provision are the primary benchmark that 
investigating authorities must use when determining whether 
goods have been provided by a government for less than 
adequate remuneration.”111  “[I]nvestigating authorities may 
use a benchmark other than private prices in the country of 
provision under Article 14(d), if it is first established that 
private prices in that country are distorted because of the 
government’s predominant role in providing those goods.”112 
Upon closer examination, the Appellate Body paid lip 
service to the idea that the term market in Article 14(d) of the 
 
 106. Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 167(b), 
WT/DS257/AB/R (January 19, 2004). 
 107. Id. ¶ 87 (citations omitted) (citing Appellate Body Report WT/DS257/AB/R, 
supra note 89). 
 108. Id. ¶ 89 (citing TRUMBLE A. STEVENSON, SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 2512 (Oxford University Press 5th ed. 2002). 
 109. See id. 
 110. Id. ¶ 96. 
 111. Id. ¶ 90. 
 112. Id. (citing id. ¶ 103). 
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SCM Agreement does not exclude situations in which there is 
government involvement.  What the Appellate Body aimed for in 
Article 14(d) is an undistorted-market benchmark.  According to 
the Appellate Body, although in-country private market prices 
are not excluded from being considered as benchmarks under 
Article 14(d), they nonetheless will be discarded if it can be 
established that they are distorted because of the government’s 
predominant role in the market.  In other words, in-country real 
market prices are to be used as benchmarks only if they are not 
distorted ( i.e., perfect). 
The undistorted-market approach to the market benchmark 
analysis begs the question of where to draw the line when 
judging whether the market that exists in the real world is 
undistorted or perfect enough to be used as a subsidy 
benchmark.  Unfortunately, the Appellate Body offered no 
guidance on this question, other than stating, “the possibility 
under Article 14(d) for investigating authorities to consider a 
benchmark other than private prices in the country of provision 
is very limited.”113  The Appellate Body acknowledged that “an 
allegation that a government is a significant supplier would not, 
on its own, prove distortion and allow an investigating authority 
to choose a benchmark other than private prices in the country 
of provision.”114  However, the Appellate Body stopped short of 
pointing out what additional evidence would be required to show 
that the market in the country under investigation is indeed 
distorted.  The Appellate Body only said that a decision on 
market distortion in the country under investigation has to be 
made “on a case-by-case basis, according to the particular facts 
underlying each countervailing duty investigation.”115 
Nor did the Appellate Body answer the question of what 
alternative benchmarks would be available to serve as proxies 
for the hypothetical undistorted market if the existing market in 
the country under investigation is rejected as distorted.  The 
Appellate Body claimed that it was not called upon to decide 
that issue.116  The only question on appeal, it said, was the 
“specific alternative method used by [the DOC] in the 
underlying countervailing duty investigation.”117  The Appellate 
Body noted that the Panel’s decision striking down the out-of-
country stumpage price benchmark used to determine adequacy 
 
 113. Id. ¶ 102. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. ¶ 106. 
 117. Id. ¶ 107. 
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of remuneration was predicated “exclusively on its 
interpretation of Article 14(d), which we have already reversed 
above.”118  Since it “made no findings of fact relating to the 
alleged distortive effect on prices of the provincial governments’ 
participation in the market for standing timber,”119 the Panel 
concluded that there were insufficient findings or facts in the 
record to justify the use of “a benchmark other than private 
prices in Canada, on the basis that prices of private stumpage in 
Canada were distorted by the Canadian provinces’ predominant 
participation in the market as providers of standing timber.”120 
In sum, despite the textual inconsistency and ambiguity of 
the SCM Agreement regarding the nature of the market in its 
market benchmark analysis, the Appellate Body’s decision in 
United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada implicitly 
espoused the undistorted-market approach to the market 
benchmark analysis.  The SCM Agreement allows investigating 
authorities to discard in-country private market prices in favor 
of out-of-country price benchmarks if it can be shown that in-
country private market prices are distorted and the alternative 
out-of-country benchmarks are in relation to prevailing market 
conditions in the country under investigation.  But the 
Appellate Body did not specify the evidentiary standards that 
must be met before investigating authorities can reject in-
country private market prices.  Nor did it set out the evidentiary 
standards for alternative benchmarks to be considered in 
relation to prevailing market conditions in the country under 
investigation.  At least for now, the Appellate Body leaves those 
two important decisions completely to the discretion of the 
investigating authorities. 
B.  THE FLOODGATE IS OPEN: SUBSEQUENT “MARKET 
DISTORTION” CASES 
Once the Appellate Body recognized the use of something 
other than existing in-country market prices as the subsidy 
benchmark, delegating the selection of alternative benchmarks 
to the discretion of investigation authorities, the DOC wasted no 
time in exercising that discretion.  In a slew of market distortion 
cases following Lumber IV,121 the DOC disqualified in-country 
 
 118. Id. ¶ 112. 
 119. Id. ¶ 115. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See infra notes 122, 123, 127, 135, 136, 137, and 138 and accompanying 
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prices as distorted and chose out-of-country prices as alternative 
benchmarks.  These cases, discussed below, cover a wide range 
of government programs, including stumpage, loan, steel input, 
petrochemical input, and land.  The selection of out-of-country 
benchmarks in these cases plays a significant role in 
determining the outcomes of the cases.  In each case, a majority 
portion of the countervailing duty rate imposed by the DOC is 
attributable to programs for which the DOC has rejected in-
country prices and selected out-of-country prices as benchmarks.   
Stumpage Subsidies — Subsequent to Lumber IV, the DOC 
dealt with the stumpage subsidy issue again in two 
countervailing duty cases concerning imports of paper products 
from Indonesia: Certain Lined Paper Products from Indonesia 
(Indonesia CLPP)122 and Coated Free Sheet Paper from 
Indonesia (Indonesia CFS Paper).123  In both cases the central 
subsidy program investigated by the DOC was the subsidy that 
the Government of Indonesia allegedly conferred on Indonesian 
producers of paper products through the provision of stumpage 
for less than adequate remuneration.124  And in both cases the 
DOC applied the three-tiered hierarchy of benchmarks from 19 
C.F.R. § 351.511(a)(2) in evaluating the adequacy of the 
remuneration for Indonesian stumpage, and rejected the use of 
in-country prices from Indonesia as the subsidy benchmark on 
the grounds that the Government of Indonesia provided all or 
nearly all of Indonesia’s stumpage.125  The DOC, then, in both 
 
text. 
 122. See Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final 
Negative Critical Circumstances Determination: Certain Lined Paper Products from 
Indonesia, 71 Fed. Reg. 47174 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 16, 2006); Issues and 
Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of Certain Lined Paper Products from Indonesia, Aug. 9, 2006 
[hereinafter Indonesia CLPP I&D Memo]. 
 123. See Coated Free Sheet Paper from Indonesia: Final Affirmative 
Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 60642 (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 25, 
2007); Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Countervailing 
Duty Determination: Coated Free Sheet Paper from Indonesia (Oct. 17, 2007) 
[hereinafter Indonesia CFS Paper I&D Memo]. 
 124. See Certain Lined Paper Products from Indonesia, 71 Fed. Reg. 7524, 7531 
(Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 13, 2006) (notice of prelim. determination); Coated Free 
Sheet Paper from Indonesia, 72 Fed. Reg. 17498, 17502 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 9, 
2007) (notice of prelim determination). 
 125. In Indonesia CLPP, the DOC found that there were no market-determined 
prices in Indonesia upon which to base a first-tier benchmark, citing the facts that 
the GOI “owned all harvestable forest land” and there was “no indication of any 
private sales of standing timber in Indonesia.”  Indonesia CLPP I&D Memo, supra 
note 18, at 5.  In Indonesia CFS Paper, the DOC rejected the use of a first-tier 
benchmark, citing the fact that the GOI “had not provided any information on the 
sale of either privately-owned standing timber in Indonesia, or the stumpage fees 
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cases opted for an out of country benchmark based on log export 
prices from Malaysia.126 
Loan Subsidies — In 2007, the DOC applied its out-of-
country benchmark analysis first enunciated in Lumber IV to 
loan subsidies in Coated Free Sheet Paper from China (China 
CFS Paper).127  In that case, the petitioner alleged, inter alia, 
that the interest paid by Chinese producers of CFS paper on 
loans provided by China’s state-owned commercial banks was 
subsidized because the interest rates were below what the 
commercial interest rates for such loans would otherwise be.128  
In evaluating loans made by Chinese state-owned commercial 
banks, the DOC rejected as subsidy benchmarks not only 
interest rates of loans from private and foreign banks in China, 
but also the Chinese national interest rates, pointing to the 
distortions created by the Chinese government’s intervention in 
the Chinese loan market.129  The DOC’s arguments for 
 
charged by private timber companies.”  Indonesia CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 
19, at 19.  The DOC further pointed out that even if the GOI provided data on 
private stumpage prices, it would not have relied on it anyway because of the 
“insignificant percentage of harvestable private land in Indonesia.”  Id. 
 126. In Indonesia CLPP, the DOC chose a third-tier benchmark based on the 
price of pulp log exports from Malaysia.  Indonesia CLPP I&D Memo, supra note 18, 
at 5.  It deducted the Indonesian logging operation’s extraction costs and profits 
from the Malaysian log export prices to arrive at a derived market stumpage price in 
Indonesia.  Id.  In Indonesia CFS Paper, the DOC again chose the same Malaysian 
pulpwood export prices as the benchmark for the Indonesian stumpage because of 
the “geographic proximity and the similarities of forest conditions, climate, and tree 
species between Indonesia and Malaysia.”  Indonesia CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra 
note 19, at 20.  As it did in Indonesia CLPP, the DOC adjusted the Malaysian log 
export prices by deducting Indonesian extraction costs and profits.  Id. 
 127. See Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 60645 (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 25, 2007) (final affirmative determination); 
Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the 
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s 
Republic of China (Oct. 17, 2007) (on file with Int’l Trade Admin.) [hereinafter China 
CFS Paper I&D Memo].  Note that the United States International Trade 
Commission made a negative final determination regarding injury.  See Coated Free 
Sheet Paper from China, Indonesia, and Korea, 72 Fed. Reg. 70892 (U.S. Int’l Trade 
Comm. Dec. 13, 2007) (final negative determination).  As a result, the DOC’s 
affirmative countervailing duty determination did not result in the imposition of 
countervailing duties.  
 128. See Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 17484, 17487 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 9, 2007) (affirmative prelim. 
determination). 
 129. The DOC first noted that the statutory criterion for judging loan subsidies 
is the “difference between the amount the recipient of the loan pays on the loan and 
the amount the recipient would pay on a comparable commercial loan that the 
recipient could actually obtain on the market.”  See China CFS Paper I&D Memo, 
supra note 127, at 5 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(ii)).  However, according to the 
DOC, loans from private and foreign banks in China are not comparable commercial 
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distortions in the Chinese loan market were twofold.  First, the 
DOC argued that the Chinese loan market is distorted because 
of the “continued overwhelming dominance of state ownership in 
Chinese banks,”130 supported by its assertion that the Chinese 
banking sector “remains almost entirely state-owned.”131  
Second, the DOC argued that the Chinese loan market is 
distorted because of “the [Chinese government’s] long history of 
using the banks to allocate resources in the economy in 
accordance with its policy objectives.”132  As evidence of this 
policy-induced distortion, the DOC cited the simultaneous 
“deposit rate cap” and “lending rate floor” that China maintains 
in order to “guarantee the banks a considerable profit margin on 
each of their loans.”133  Having rejected in-country loan 
benchmarks, the DOC turned to an out-of-country interest rate 
benchmark based on the interest rates of a group of thirty-three 
lower- to middle-income countries, because of the “broad inverse 
relationship between income and interest rates.”134 
After China CFS Paper, the DOC adopted the same out-of-
country benchmark for Chinese loans in four subsequent cases 
involving imports from China: Circular Welded Carbon Quality 
Steel Pipe from China (China CWP),135 Light-Walled 
Rectangular Pipe and Tube from China (China LWP),136 
 
loans due to the significant distortions created by the Chinese government’s 
interventions in the banking sector.  Id. at 5–6.  The DOC then noted that if a firm 
does not have comparable commercial loans, its regulations allow it to use a 
“national interest rate for comparable commercial loans.”  Id. at 6 (citing 
19 C.F.R. § 351.505(a)(3)(ii).  But the DOC found that the Chinese national interest 
rates are not reliable benchmarks, because of the “pervasiveness of the [Chinese 
government]’s intervention in the banking sector.”  Id. at 6. 
 130. Id. at 67–68. 
 131. Id. at 67. 
 132. Id. at 67–68. 
 133. Id. at 68. 
 134. Id. at 6.  The DOC constructed the out-of-country loan benchmark by using 
a regression of inflation-adjusted interest rates of the comparison countries on a 
composite index of World Bank governance indicators that measure the quality of 
each country’s institutions across dimensions such as political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.  Id. 
 135. See Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic 
of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 31966 (Dep’t of Commerce Jun. 5, 2008) (final affirmative 
determination); Issues and Decision Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, to David M. Spooner, Assistant 
Secretary for Import Administration, for Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe 
from the People’s Republic of China (May 29, 2008) (final determination), available 
at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-12606-1.pdf [hereinafter China CWP 
I&D Memo]. 
 136. See Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube From People’s Republic of 
China, 73 Fed. Reg. 35642 (Dep’t of Commerce Jun. 24, 2008) (final affirmative 
determination); Issues and Decision Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy 
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Laminated Woven Sacks from China (China Sacks),137 and New 
Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from China (China Tires).138 
Input Subsidies — In three countervailing duty cases 
involving imports from China subsequent to Lumber IV—China 
CWP, China LWP, and China Sacks—the DOC used an out-of-
country benchmark to measure the subsidies the Chinese 
government allegedly conferred on Chinese producers through 
the provision of input for less than adequate remuneration.  Two 
of three cases (China CWP and China LWP) involved steel 
input, while the third (China Sacks) involved petrochemical 
input.  In all three cases the DOC rejected the use of actual 
market prices within China for the input in question, as the 
subsidy benchmarks, on the grounds that China’s state-owned-
enterprises (SOEs) account for the overwhelming majority of the 
production and sale of the input in question.139  Having rejected 
 
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, to David M. Spooner, Assistant 
Secretary for Import Administration, for Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube 
from the People’s Republic of China (June 13, 2008) (final determination), available 
at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-14250-1.pdf [hereinafter China LWP 
I&D Memo]. 
 137. See Laminated Woven Sacks From the People’s Republic of China, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 35639 (Dep’t of Commerce June 24, 2008) (final determination); Issues and 
Decision Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Import Administration, to David M. Spooner, Assistant Secretary for Import 
Administration, for Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of China 
(June 16, 2008) (final determination), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/ 
PRC/E8-14256-1.pdf [hereinafter China Sacks I&D Memo]. 
 138. See Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People’s Republic 
of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 40480 (Dep’t of Commerce July 15, 2008) (final 
determination); Issues and Decision Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, to David M. Spooner, Assistant 
Secretary for Import Administration, for Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires 
(OTR Tires) from the People’s Republic of China (July 7, 2008) (final determination), 
available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-16154-1.pdf [hereinafter 
China Tires I&D Memo]. 
 139. In China CWP, the input in question is hot-rolled steel.  The DOC found 
that 96.1% of hot-rolled steel production is China is from SOEs.  China CWP I&D 
Memo, supra note 135, at 64.  Citing to the preamble to its 1998 countervailing duty 
regulations, the DOC stated: 
[W]here the Department finds that the government provides the majority, 
or a substantial portion of the market for a good or service, prices for such 
goods and services in the country will be considered significantly distorted 
and will not be an appropriate basis of comparison for determining 
whether there is a benefit. 
Id. at 64 n.205 (citing Preamble to 1998 CVD Regulations at 65377).  In China LWP, 
a case involving the same hot-rolled steel input as in China CWP, the DOC repeated 
the same finding of facts and reasoning as in China CWP in rejecting the use of 
Chinese hot-rolled steel prices as the subsidy benchmark.  See China LWP I&D 
Memo, supra note 136, at 35–37.  In China Sacks, the input in question is a 
petrochemical input called biaxial-oriented polypropylene (BOPP).  The DOC found 
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Chinese prices as the subsidy benchmark, the DOC selected an 
out-of-country price as the benchmark for the input in question 
in all three cases.140 
Land Subsidies — In China Sacks, the DOC applied its out-
of-country benchmark analysis to yet another factor of 
production—land.  The subsidy issue concerning land in that 
case was whether the Chinese government provided land-use 
rights to Chinese producers for less than adequate 
remuneration.141  Noting that the Chinese government, either at 
the national or local level, is the ultimate owner of all land in 
China,142 the DOC rejected in-country land prices as 
benchmarks because “Chinese land prices are distorted by the 
significant government role in the market.”143  The DOC then 
went on to look for “comparable market-based prices for land 
purchases in a country at a comparable level of economic 
development that is reasonably proximate to, but outside of, 
China.”144  The DOC finally settled on land values in Thailand 
as reported by an industry publication as the land 
benchmark.145 
In the above “market distortion” cases, the resort to out-of-
country benchmarks plays a very significant role in determining 
the outcome of each case.  The following table lists the 
countervailing duty rates found by the DOC for some of the 
major foreign respondents in the market distortion cases.  For 
each of the respondents, the first column of the table shows the 
overall countervailing duty rate, the second column shows the 
countervailing duty rate attributable to programs for which the 
DOC engaged in the market distortion analysis and selected 
out-of-country benchmarks, and the third column calculates the 
percentage of the overall countervailing duty rate attributable 
 
through adverse inference from the failure of the Chinese government to provide 
relevant information that the production and sale of BOPP in China is dominated by 
SOEs.  See China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137, at 19.  The DOC then rejected 
Chinese BOPP prices as the subsidy benchmark using the same reasoning as in 
China CWP and China LWP.  See id. 
 140. In China CWP, the DOC used the world market export prices as reported in 
SteelBenchmarker, an international steel industry publication, as the subsidy 
benchmark.  See China CWP I&D Memo, supra note 135, at 66; China LWP I&D 
Memo, supra note 136, at 37.  In China Sacks, the DOC selected the world market 
prices for BOPP as reported by the London Metals Exchange as the subsidy 
benchmark.  See China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137, at 19. 
 141. See China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137, at 14. 
 142. Id. at 15. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 17. 
 145. Id. 
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to programs for which out-of-country benchmarks were used.  
The types of the programs for which out-of-country benchmarks 
were used are indicated in parentheses following the 
countervailing duty rates reported in the second column.  As is 
shown in the table, for every respondent the majority of the 
total countervailing duty margin imposed by the DOC resulted 
from government programs for which the DOC rejected in-
country prices on market distortion grounds and selected out-of-
country prices as benchmarks.  In some cases, out-of-country 
benchmarks account for one hundred percent of the margins.  
Were it not for the use of out-of-country benchmarks, the 
countervailing duty margins in most of the cases would have 
been much lower, and may not have existed at all. 
 Table 1.  The Role of the Market Distortion Analysis in 
Certain Countervailing Duty Cases146 
 
Overall 
CVD Rate 
CVD Rate 
Attributable 
to Programs 
for Which 
Out-of-
Country 
Benchmarks 
Are Used 
Percentage of 
the Overall 
CVD Rate 
Attributable 
to Programs 
for Which 
Out-of-
Country 
Benchmarks 
Are Used 
Lumber IV 
     Canada147 19.34% 19.25% 
(stumpage) 
99.5%
Indonesia CLPP 
     TK 40.55% 39.37% 
(stumpage) 
97.1%
Indonesia CFS Paper
     TK/PT 22.48% 14.21% 63.2%
 
 146. Data for this table is compiled from the DOC’s Final Determinations and 
Issues & Decision memoranda issued in the cases identified in the table.  See 
Lumber IV CVD I&D Memo, supra note 94; Indonesia CLPP I&D Memo, supra note 
122; Indonesia CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 123; China CFS Paper I&D Memo, 
supra note 127; China CWP I&D Memo, supra note 135; China LWP I&D Memo, 
supra note 136; China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137;  China Tires I&D Memo, 
supra note 138. 
 147. Due to the large number of lumber producers in Canada, the DOC decided 
to conduct an aggregate investigation in Lumber IV, resulting in a Canada-wide 
countervailing duty rate. 
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(stumpage)
China CFS Paper 
     Gold East  7.40% 4.11% (loan) 55.5%
China CWP 
     Kingland 44.86% 44.84% (input) 99.9%
     Weifang East 
Pipe 
29.57% 27.35% (input) 92.5%
China LWP 
     ZZ Pipe 15.28% 15.28% (input, 
land) 
100%
     Kunshan Lets 
Win 
2.7% 1.9% (input) 70.4%
China Sacks 
     Zibo Aifudi 29.54% 29.54% (loan, 
input, land) 
100%
China Tires 
     Hebei 
Starbright 
2.38% 2.37% (loan, 
input) 
99.6%
     Guizhou Tyre 3.13% 2.98% (loan, 
input, land) 
95.2%
     Tianjin 
United Tire 
6.59% 6.22% (loan, 
input) 
94.4%
IV.  THE PITFALLS OF THE MARKET BENCHMARK 
ANALYSIS IN COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW 
As discussed above, the market benchmark analysis in the 
countervailing duty law has come a long way.  In the early days 
the law lacked a definition of subsidy, much less an explanation 
of subsidy benchmarks.  With the establishment of the WTO 
and the adoption of the SCM Agreement, a working definition of 
subsidy that embraced the market as the only benchmark for 
identifying and measuring subsidies was established.  
Furthermore, the Appellate Body of the WTO makes it clear 
that the SCM Agreement envisions a perfect market, or a 
market undistorted by government presence or intervention, in 
its market benchmark analysis.  This undistorted-market 
approach requires that, when identifying and measuring 
subsidies conferred by a government action, the terms of the 
government action must be compared with the terms that would 
arise in an undistorted, perfect market.  The economic logic of 
undistorted-market benchmarks is straightforward: an 
undistorted market allocates resources efficiently, and therefore 
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subsidies can be identified and measured through deviations 
from the most efficient resource allocation in an undistorted 
market. 
The undistorted-market approach to the market benchmark 
analysis leaves countervailing duty law in constant search for 
the undistorted market, which exists only in the counterfactual 
world.  Unfortunately, as is demonstrated below, the search for 
the undistorted market is fraught with pitfalls that seriously 
undermine the validity and suitability of the undistorted-
market approach. 
A.  DETERMINING DISTORTION 
The search for the undistorted market starts with the 
question of whether the private market in place in the country 
under investigation is distorted.  If there is no distortion, the 
inquiry ends and the in-country private market prices will serve 
as the subsidy benchmark.  Yet if there is an allegation that in-
country private market prices are distorted by the very 
government action that is accused of conferring subsidies, 
investigating authorities must decide whether to reject the 
existing private market prices as distorted.  But on what basis is 
a market determined to be distorted? 
Since the SCM Agreement and the countervailing duty 
statute do not specify how market distortion should be 
determined, the DOC has exercised its regulatory discretion to 
come up with its own market distortion analysis.  As in the 
market distortion cases summarized above, the primary factor 
the DOC looks for in its market distortion analysis is whether 
the government provides a majority, or a substantial portion, of 
the market in question.148  If the government is the dominant 
player in the market, the DOC reasons, private market prices 
will be dependent upon the government price.149  Therefore, if 
the government prices its products or services at below-market 
prices, the private market prices must attempt to match the 
government price, resulting in distortion of the private market 
price.  Using private market prices as subsidy benchmarks 
under that circumstance, the DOC believes, would be like 
comparing the government price to itself.150 
First, we should note a paradox inherent in the market 
benchmark analysis when the government is the predominant 
 
 148. See supra notes 125, 131, 139, and 142 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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provider (or, in economic jargon, has market power).151  
Rudimentary economics tells us that resource allocation is 
efficient only in competitive markets.152  In a market where one 
provider has market power, the market price will be higher, and 
the quantity of production lower, than the socially optimal 
level.153  So when the government has market power, what is 
the market price with which the government price is supposed 
to be compared in the market benchmark analysis?  Is it the 
market price that would prevail in a competitive market, i.e., a 
market where no one has market power?  Or is it the market 
price that would prevail if the same entity that has market 
power were a private profit-maximizing entity?  If it is the 
former, the comparison is apples-to-oranges.  But if it is the 
latter, why should the price charged by a private firm that has 
market power serve as a proxy for economic efficiency when that 
price itself is an outcome of market imperfection and thus is not 
efficient?  From the standpoint of economic efficiency, in a 
market characterized by market power, the government is 
justified to price a product that it provides below the price that 
would be charged by a private provider with the same degree of 
market power.  Ironically, under the DOC’s market benchmark 
analysis, it is precisely this efficiency-enhancing under-pricing 
that will be treated as a subsidy. 
That issue aside, the DOC’s market-distortion analysis is 
circular.  As the Appellate Body pointed out, the fact that the 
government is the predominant player in the market in and of 
itself would not disqualify government prices as market 
benchmarks.154  The government could provide the majority of 
the goods or services in a market and still provide the goods or 
services at the price that a profit-maximizing private provider 
would provide.  Whether the government will indeed price its 
 
 151. “Market power” is a measure of “the degree of control that a single firm or a 
small number of firms have over the price and production decisions in an industry.”  
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 164.  The courts have defined market 
power as “the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output.”  Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (citing Fortner Enter., 
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) and United States v. E. I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)).  The existence of market 
power usually is inferred from the seller’s possession of a predominant share of the 
market.   Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 464 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. 
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 17 (1984); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 
571 (1966); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611–13 
(1953)). 
 152. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 341–42. 
 153. See id. at 172. 
 154. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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goods or services at below-market prices will depend on both the 
government’s intention in providing the goods or services and 
the government’s ability to gather and act on market 
information that would allow it to price its goods or services at 
market prices.  The whole purpose of the market benchmark 
analysis is to distinguish instances in which the government 
makes financial contributions on market-determined terms from 
instances in which the government makes financial 
contributions on terms more favorable than market-determined 
ones.  However, the DOC’s market distortion analysis states 
that when the government dominates the market, private 
market prices will be distorted by the government price if the 
government price is not set at market rates.  The word if—
followed by no analysis of whether the government prices are 
indeed set at market rates—reveals the circular nature of the 
DOC’s reasoning.  The DOC essentially creates a presumption 
that the government will not price its goods or services at 
market rates.  Under this presumption, the government will 
distort market prices when it has the ability to do so, i.e., when 
it is a dominant player in the market.  In effect, this circular 
analysis treats the predominance of the government in the 
market as the only showing required for a finding of market 
distortion, a proposition that has been firmly rejected by the 
Appellate Body. 155  Indeed, in all of the market-distortion cases 
to date, the DOC determined that the market in question is 
distorted by demonstrating nothing more than the fact that the 
government is the dominant provider in the market.156 
In one category of market distortion cases, i.e., those 
involving Chinese loan subsidies, the DOC has disqualified in-
country private market prices as subsidy benchmarks by 
pointing to not only the dominant status of the government in 
the market but also broader regulatory restrictions imposed by 
the government on the market.  Specifically, the DOC argued 
that lending rates in China are distorted by the government 
because, in addition to the dominance by the state-owned 
commercial banks in the loan market, the government 
“maintains both a deposit rate cap and a lending rate floor 
simultaneously.”157  However, regulatory constraints on market 
 
 155. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Indonesia CLPP I&D Memo, supra note 18, at 5; Indonesia CFS Paper 
I&D Memo, supra note 19, at 19; China CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 127, at 
67; China CWP I&D Memo, supra note 135, at 64; China LWP I&D Memo, supra 
note 136, at 35–37; China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137, at 15 & 19. 
 157. China CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 133, at 68. 
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prices do not necessarily have distorting effects.  Regulatory 
constraints are “distorting” only when they are “binding,” i.e., 
when they would have altered private behaviors.158  If the 
supply and demand of the market is such that the resulting 
market price would be the same with or without the regulatory 
constraints, the existence of those regulatory constraints would 
not have changed the behavior of the private market and 
therefore will not be distorting.159  Determining whether a 
specific regulatory constraint has binding effects is a 
complicated exercise that requires economic modeling and 
examination of empirical data.160  The DOC, however, has not 
acknowledged the necessity of undertaking this exercise. 
Even if a regulatory constraint is shown to be binding on 
market prices, the more difficult question is to what extent it 
should disqualify market prices as subsidy benchmarks.  
Obviously, not all government intervention in the market 
should be considered market-distorting.  But the question is 
where to draw the line?  In the United States, for example, the 
Federal Reserve regulates the aggregate amount of money 
supply through several instruments, the most prominent of 
which is open market operations.161  The aggregate amount of 
money supply, in turn, impacts interest rates in the market.162  
Given the prominent role of the Federal Reserve’s money supply 
policies in influencing interest rates, should those policies be 
considered market-distorting?  How should we distinguish 
legitimate government intervention from government 
intervention that should be countervailed?  Obviously, this line-
drawing exercise does not lend itself to clear-cut answers and, if 
 
 158. JOHN LEACH, A COURSE IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS 327 (2004) (“A constraint on 
an agent is non-binding if it requires him to do something that he would have done 
anyway.”). 
 159. For example, if the market equilibrium interest rate is 5%, and the 
government imposes a 6% cap on interest rate, the cap will not be binding and 
therefore will not be distorting. 
 160. For example, the United States maintained interest rate ceilings on 
deposits through what has come to be known as Regulation Q between 1933 and 
1986.  However, economists have demonstrated that between 1933 and 1966, the 
deposit rate ceilings imposed by Regulation Q were binding for only a few short 
intervals.  See, e.g., R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and 
Why It Passed Away, THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW, Feb. 1986, at 
22–37, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/86/02/ 
Requiem_Feb1986.pdf. 
 161. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 458–71 (5th Ed. 1997) 
 162. Indeed, in open market operations, the Federal Reserve sets a target 
federal funds rate first and then decides how large a change in bank reserves is 
needed to obtain the desired level of the federal funds rate.  Id. at 459. 
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allowed, will leave decisions about market distortion completely 
to agency discretion. 
B.  WHAT ALTERNATIVE BENCHMARKS WILL REPLICATE THE 
COUNTERFACTUAL UNDISTORTED MARKET? 
We have explained that the first step in the undistorted-
market benchmark analysis is to decide whether in-country 
private market prices are distorted.  We have shown that the 
justifications offered for findings of market distortion by the 
DOC are undermined by its circular reasoning and 
inconsistency with basic economic principles.  As discussed 
below, the problem stems from the wide latitude granted to the 
DOC to conduct an essentially free-wheeling market distortion 
analysis.  This problem is further exacerbated by the same, if 
not wider, latitude granted to the DOC to choose alternative 
benchmarks.  In all of the cases in which the DOC has found 
market distortion and therefore rejected in-country private 
market prices as subsidy benchmarks, the DOC has turned to 
an out-of-country benchmark—a benchmark taken from outside 
of the country under investigation.163  However, as is discussed 
below, out-of-country benchmarks do not serve the purpose they 
are supposed to serve, i.e., replicating the price that would 
prevail in an undistorted market in the country under 
investigation. 
Although the DOC has repeatedly opted for out-of-country 
benchmarks, it has not explained exactly why a price in one 
country could somehow be indicative of the correct price level in 
another country.  However, upon closer analysis, the DOC’s 
selection of out-of-country benchmarks seem to be based on two 
different economic concepts—the law of one price and the 
comparability of prices between countries sharing common 
characteristics. 
In cases involving goods that are tradable across countries, 
such as logs,164 steel inputs,165 and petrochemical inputs,166 the 
DOC’s out-of-country benchmark analysis is implicitly 
 
 163. See China CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 127, at 6; China CWP I&D 
Memo, supra note 135, at 66; China LWP I&D Memo, supra note 136, at 37; China 
Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137, at 17, 19; Indonesia CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra 
note 123, at 20; Indonesia CLPP I&D Memo, supra note 122, at 5. 
 164. See Indonesia CFS Paper, supra note 123; Indonesia CLPP, supra note 122; 
Lumber IV, supra note 94. 
 165. See China CWP I&D Memo, supra note 135; China LWP I&D Memo, supra 
note 136. 
 166. See China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137. 
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predicated on what economists call the law of one price.  The 
law of one price is an economic hypothesis stating that in an 
efficient market, identical goods must have identical prices.167  
When it comes to international trade, the law of one price 
predicts “if there were no obstacles to trade and no costs of 
transporting goods, the price of a given good would be the same 
all over the world.”168  The driving force behind the law of one 
price is market arbitrage.169  In a market with negligible 
transportation costs, perfect information, and no barriers to 
trade, buyers will buy goods from a place where the price is 
lower and sell them to a place where the price is higher, which 
causes prices in different places to converge.  The logic behind 
the DOC’s out-of-country benchmark analysis is as follows: since 
prices across national borders are supposed to be the same if 
there is a difference between the price in the country under 
investigation and the price in the benchmark country, then the 
difference must be because of market distortion caused by 
government subsidies in the country under investigation. 
The problem with this reasoning is that the law of one price 
requires very strict preconditions for it to hold.  Economists 
have demonstrated that the preconditions for the law of one 
price are so onerous that the law of one price is more of a 
theoretical construct than a depiction of reality.  Empirical 
economic studies support the conclusion that the law of one 
price fails in virtually every market.170  One of the major 
obstacles to the law of one price holding in reality is the 
transportation cost that must be incurred in order to arbitrage 
goods.  Therefore, prices from different locations will differ at 
least by costs of transportation between the locations.171  But in 
 
 167. See Owen A. Lamont & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Law of One 
Price in Financial Markets, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 191 (2003). 
 168. STANLEY FISCHER & RUDIGER DORNBUSCH, ECONOMICS 203 (1983). 
 169. See, e.g., Paul G.J. O’Connell & Shang-Jin Wei, “The Bigger They Are, the 
Harder They Fall”: How Price Differences Across U.S. Cities Are Arbitraged, 56 J. 
INT’L ECON. 21 (2002). 
 170. A leading international economics textbook summarizes the empirical 
evidence for the law of one price as the following: 
A large body of empirical evidence shows, however, that the law of one 
price fails dramatically in practice, even for products that commonly enter 
international trade.  The reasons include transport costs, official trade 
barriers, and noncompetitive market structures.  Transport costs are so 
high for some commodities that they become nontraded goods. 
MAURICE OBSTFELD & KENNETH ROGOFF, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
MACROECONOMICS 202 (1996). 
 171. For a technical analysis of how the cost of trading goods leads to deviation 
from the law of one price, see Panos Michael, A. Robert Nobay & David A. Peel, 
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its out-of-country benchmark analysis, the DOC never adjusts 
its out-of-country benchmarks to reflect the costs of transporting 
the goods in question between the country under investigation 
and the benchmark country.172 
Furthermore, even if the DOC has adjusted its out-of-
country benchmarks for transportation costs, prices across 
national borders could still differ for other reasons.  Empirical 
evidence shows that the law of one price fails to a greater extent 
across national borders than can be explained by distance.  This 
is the so-called “thick border effect,” meaning prices across 
national borders differ more than prices within a country.173  
The thick border effect is typically explained by a variety of 
factors, including currency differences, measurement 
conventions, nominal price stickiness, regulatory and tax laws, 
tariffs, and quotas.174  Government presence and intervention in 
the market may cause prices to differ across national borders, 
but it is only one of the many factors that could do so.  
Therefore, the difference between the price in the country under 
investigation and the price in the benchmark country cannot be 
attributed solely to market distortion in the country under 
investigation. 
Another economic concept relied on by the DOC in justifying 
out-of-country benchmarks is the concept that prices are 
comparable among countries sharing certain common 
characteristics, such as developmental stage or income level.  
The DOC has implicitly embraced this justification in cases 
involving non-tradable assets, such as lands and loans.  In 
China Sacks, the DOC justifies its selection of land prices from 
Thailand as the benchmark for Chinese land prices by arguing 
 
Transactions Costs and Nonlinear Adjustment in Real Exchange Rates: An 
Empirical Investigation, 105 J. POL. ECON. 862 (1997). 
 172. Indeed, even if the DOC were willing to do the transportation cost 
adjustment, it would not be able to do so because data on the cost of transportation 
between the country under investigation and the benchmark country do not exist. 
 173. For example, one study finds that the U.S.-Canada border reduces trade 
flows by more than a factor of 20 compared to trade of equal distances among 
provinces.  See John McCallum, National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional 
Trade Patterns, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 615–23 (1995).  Another study finds that price 
volatility across the U.S.-Canada border is much larger, corrected for distance, than 
among either U.S. cities or Canadian cities.  See Charles Engel & John H. Rogers, 
How Wide is the Border?, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1112–25 (1996). 
 174. See Engel & Rogers, supra note 173; Charles Engel & John H. Rogers, 
Deviations from Purchasing Power Parity: Causes and Welfare Costs, 55 J. INT’L 
ECON. 29–58 (1999); Carolyn L. Evans, The Economic Significance of National 
Border Effects, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1291–312 (2003); David C. Parsley & Shang-Jin 
Wei, Limiting Currency Volatility to Stimulate Good Market Integration: A Price 
Based Approach (NBER Working Paper No. 8468, 2001). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009  8:57 AM 
2010] PITFALLS OF THE (PERFECT) MARKET BENCHMARK 43 
that “China and Thailand have similar levels of per capita 
[gross national income], and that producers consider a number 
of markets, including Thailand, as an option for diversifying 
production bases in Asia beyond China.”175  The essence of this 
argument is that countries with the same per capita gross 
national income will have the same land price. 
In the market distortion cases involving loans, the DOC 
adopts a similar approach.  For example, recall that in China 
CFS Paper, the DOC constructed an out-of-country benchmark 
for Chinese loans based on a regression analysis of inflation-
adjusted interest rates of a group of thirty-three countries with 
similar national income levels.176  The DOC justifies this 
benchmark by arguing that there is a “broad inverse 
relationship between income and interest rates.”177  Implicit in 
this argument is the proposition that countries with similar 
income levels will see similar interest rates.  Unlike in China 
Sacks, where the DOC chooses only one data point (i.e., 
Thailand) for comparison, the DOC in the loan benchmark cases 
chooses multiple data points and uses as control variables other 
factors that it thinks may affect interest rates.178  But the 
similarity between the land benchmark analysis and the loan 
benchmark analysis is clear: both operate on the premise that 
the price in one country or a group of countries could predict the 
price in another country if the countries share certain 
characteristics that have been shown to correlate with price 
levels. 
However, the central defect in the DOC’s land and loan 
benchmark analysis is that it confuses the statistical concept of 
correlation with the mathematical concept of equality.  
Statistical correlation between two variables, say, variable a 
and variable b, only means that variable a moves in tandem 
with variable b.179  It does not mean that for any given value of 
variable a, variable b will always have the same value.180  
Indeed, for a given value of variable a, the value of variable b 
could be all over the place, despite the overall correlation 
between variable a and variable b across different data 
 
 175. See China Sacks I&D Memo, supra note 137, at 17. 
 176. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 177. See China CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 127, at 6. 
 178. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 179. See TIMOTHY C. URDAN, STATISTICS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 75 (2001) (“A positive 
correlation indicates that the values on the two variables being analyzed move in the 
same direction. . . . A negative correlation indicates that the values on the two 
variables being analyzed move in opposite directions.”). 
 180. Id. 
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points.181  This concept can be demonstrated in Figure 1 below, 
which shows a hypothetical relationship between land price and 
income. 
In Figure 1, there exists a positive correlation between land 
price and income, as can be seen from the positively sloped 
regression line.  Suppose data point A represents Thailand and 
data point B represents China.  The choice of data points A and 
B is such that they have the same value for income, but the land 
price values for the two data points could not be further apart 
among all of the data points.  Thus, the land price value of data 
point A cannot predict the land price value of data point B, 
despite the overall positive correlation between land price and 
income. 
 Figure 1. Land Price versus Income (Hypothetical) 
Using multiple data points, rather than one data point, in 
the out-of-country benchmark analysis does not solve the 
problem.  In the loan benchmark cases, the DOC’s implicit 
assumption is that because of the inverse relationship between 
national income and interest rate, the interest rate of China 
must be the same as the fitted interest rate of a group of thirty-
three countries with similar income levels—had it not been for 
government distortion of China’s financial market.  But the 
DOC’s reasoning on this point fails.  The fitted values of the 
dependent variable in a regression lie on the regression line, 
 
 181. Id. 
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which, as shown in Figure 1 above, is not expected to intersect 
with any data points utilized in the regression except by pure 
coincidence.  Therefore, there is no basis to expect that the 
interest rate of one country (China) will be equal to the fitted 
value of the interest rate of a group of countries with similar 
income levels, even though there is an inverse relationship 
between interest rate and national income. 
In sum, regardless of how the DOC may have implicitly 
justified its out-of-country benchmarks, its justifications are 
supported neither by economic theories nor by empirical 
evidence.  Under the undistorted-market approach, not only is 
the DOC given a free pass to reject in-country private market 
prices as distorted and unfit to serve as subsidy benchmarks, it 
is given a free pass to resort to out-of-country benchmarks that 
are unreliable proxies of the prices that would exist in an 
undistorted market.  The difference between the out-of-country 
benchmark and the government price will in turn be used by the 
DOC as evidence that the domestic market of the country under 
investigation is distorted.  In this sense, the DOC’s market 
distortion and out-of-country benchmark analyses are fed into a 
negative feedback loop and reinforce each other’s flaws. 
C.  IS THE SEARCH FOR THE UNDISTORTED MARKET NECESSARY? 
As discussed above, the DOC’s rejection of in-country 
markets as distorted and its resort to out-of-country 
benchmarks as alternatives rest on untenable grounds.  These 
pitfalls of the market benchmark analysis can be characterized 
as technical.  The next pitfall is more fundamental and proves 
fatal for the undistorted- or perfect-market approach to the 
market benchmark analysis in countervailing duty law. 
The fatal pitfall of the market benchmark analysis in 
countervailing duty law lies in the fundamental disconnect 
between the undistorted market benchmark and the purpose it 
supposedly serves.  The undistorted-market approach to the 
market benchmark analysis looks to the market undistorted by 
government presence or intervention as the benchmark for 
subsidies.  Ostensibly, the rationale for that approach is that an 
undistorted market allocates resources efficiently, and subsidies 
can thus be identified and measured by deviations from efficient 
resource allocation in an undistorted market.  But a market in 
which there is no government presence or intervention may still 
not be perfect from the standpoint of economic efficiency.  There 
are many instances where a market free of government presence 
or intervention fails to achieve efficient resource allocation 
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because of so-called “market failures.”182  As has been widely 
documented elsewhere, market failures arise due to a variety of 
reasons, chief among which are imperfect competition, 
externality, asymmetric information, and increasing returns to 
scale.183  When a market fails, the prices prevailing in the 
market are no longer socially optimal.184  Under such 
circumstances, government subsidies aimed at addressing 
market failures may actually enhance market efficiency rather 
than reduce it.185  An undistorted market, even if it somehow 
could be replicated, is no guarantee of economic efficiency. 
To make matters worse, the ostensible goal of the market 
benchmark in countervailing duty law—economic efficiency—is 
not even the goal of the countervailing duty law itself.  The 
efficiency justification for countervailing duty law has been 
ventured, and rejected, by many economists and legal 
scholars.186  There are two chief reasons for rejecting the 
 
 182. Market failure is defined in economics as failure of market to achieve 
allocative efficiency.  Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. 
ECON. 351, 351 (1958) (“[Market failure] . . . at least in allocation theory, mean[s] 
the failure of a more or less idealized system of price-market institutions to sustain 
‘desirable’ activities or to estop “undesirable’ activities.”). 
 183. See, e.g., STIGLITZ & WALSH, supra note 3, at 239–56; World Trade 
Organization, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2006: EXPLORING THE LINKS BETWEEN 
SUBSIDIES, TRADE, AND THE WTO 58–62 (2006). 
 184. See ROY RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 398 
(1983). 
 185. For example, economists have argued that the positive externalities of 
research and development (R&D) make a certain amount of R&D subsidies welfare 
enhancing.  See Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Growth and Welfare in a 
Small Open Economy, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 141, 142 
(Elhanan Helpman & Assaf Razin eds. 1991) (“There always exists an optimal 
subsidy to R&D that speeds growth relative to the market-determined rate.  
Increasing the rate of subsidization beyond this optimum causes the growth rate to 
increase still further but does so at the expense of welfare.”). 
 186. See John J. Barcelo III, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties—Analysis and 
a Proposal, 9 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 779 (1977); Richard Diamond, Economic 
Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law, 29 VA. J. INT’L L. 767 (1988) [hereinafter 
Diamond, Foundations]; Richard Diamond, A Search for Economic and Financial 
Principles in the Administration of United States Countervailing Duty Law, 21 LAW 
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 507 (1989) [hereinafter Diamond, Economic and Financial 
Principles]; Warren F. Schwartz & Eugene W. Harper, The Regulation of Subsidies 
Affecting International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 831 (1972); Charles Goetz, Lloyd 
Granet & Warren Schwartz, The Meaning of “Subsidy” and “Injury” in the 
Countervailing Duty Law, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 17 (1986); Warren F. Schwartz, 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States: Countervailing Duties and the Regulation of 
International Trade, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 297 (1978); Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing 
Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1989) [hereinafter 
Sykes, An Economic Perspective]; Alan O. Sykes, Second-Best Countervailing Duty 
Policy: A Critique of the Entitlement Approach, 21 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 699 
(1989) [hereinafter Sykes, A Critique of the Entitlement Approach]. 
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efficiency justification for countervailing duty law.  First, as said 
above, countervailing duty law makes no distinction between 
efficient subsidies and inefficient subsidies.187  Second, the lack 
of coordination among trading partners in the imposition of 
countervailing duties makes countervailing duty law unlikely to 
have systematic deterrent effects.188 
Nor could countervailing duty law be reformulated to serve 
the purpose of advancing economic efficiency.  Such re-
formulation faces two obstacles.  First, conceptually, there is no 
consensus on what subsidies are efficiency-enhancing and what 
subsidies are efficiency-reducing.189  Without such consensus, it 
is impossible to set out what exactly the market benchmark 
analysis should deter.  Second, even assuming a subsidy is 
efficiency-enhancing, it is impossible for investigating 
authorities to gather all the information necessary for 
concluding whether the government is subsidizing by the correct 
amount from the efficiency standpoint.  That a government 
subsidy remedies market failures conceptually does not preclude 
the possibility that the government may over-subsidize in 
practice.  For example, if there are reasons to believe that a 
private firm investing in a new technology will not reap all the 
benefits of the technology to the greater society because, for 
example, the social benefit of the technology is greater than its 
private benefit, the government will be justified in subsidizing 
the firm investing in the technology, through either grants or 
loans with interest rates lower than prevailing market rates.  
But the government subsidy is efficiency-enhancing only if it 
helps make up for the gap between private benefit and social 
benefit, not a bit more.  If it results in private benefit being 
greater than social benefit, it will create efficiency losses of its 
own.  To know whether the government subsidy falls within the 
efficiency-enhancing range, investigating authorities need to 
find ways to quantify the technology’s social and private benefit.  
Unfortunately, that is something that investigating 
authorities—or anyone else, for that matter—are unable to do 
without gathering an enormous amount of information.  
Therefore, despite being a neat theoretical proposition, a 
countervailing duty law that measures government subsidies 
 
 187. See Sykes, A Critique of the Entitlement Approach, supra note 186, at 699. 
 188. If the threat of countervailing duties could deter the conferment of 
inefficient subsidies, the countervailing duty law would be in the mutual interest of 
all nations, thereby promoting global economic efficiency.  See id.; see also Sykes, An 
Economic Perspective, supra note 186, at 200–01. 
 189. See Skyes, An Economic Perspective, supra note 186, at 200–01. 
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against the efficiency standard cannot be realistically 
implemented in practice. 
It is also doubtful that countervailing duty law will result in 
greater economic welfare for the country applying it.  When an 
exporting country confers a subsidy on the production of a good, 
a portion of the subsidy will be passed on to the consumers of 
the country to which the good is exported in the form of lower 
price.  Although the producers of the same good in the importing 
country will suffer from the subsidy, the importing country as a 
whole will benefit from the subsidy because the resources that 
have been used to manufacture the good in the importing 
country will be shifted to uses of higher value.  The consumers 
in the importing country will benefit more than producers in the 
importing country who will suffer from the subsidy.190  If the 
importing country imposes countervailing duties to raise the 
price of the imported good, under most circumstances the lost 
welfare to its consumers will outweigh the benefits to its 
producers plus the additional government revenue collected 
from the countervailing duties.191 
If economic efficiency is not the purpose of the 
countervailing duty law, then what is?  And why does the 
countervailing duty law exist in the first place?  Responding to 
these questions, some scholars go as far as suggesting that 
countervailing duty law serves no useful purpose and the first 
best policy would be to abolish countervailing duty law 
altogether.192 
However, economic efficiency is not the only possible 
rationale for international trade policy.  A country may want to 
base its international trade policy on goals not related to 
economic efficiency, such as protection of domestic employment, 
 
 190. See Schwartz, supra note 186, at 305–06. 
 191. For a technical evaluation of the welfare consequences of countervailing 
duties for the importing country, see Sykes, An Economic Perspective, supra note 
186, at 213–29.  To summarize, when the import supply is perfectly elastic, the loss 
in consumer surplus caused by countervailing duties outweighs the gains in 
producer surplus and government revenue derived from countervailing duties.  
When the import supply is imperfectly elastic, the welfare analysis of the 
countervailing duty law is more complicated, but still it will be a mere coincidence 
that the imposition of countervailing duties will lead to net welfare gains.  
Furthermore, although the economic literature on strategic trade policy suggests 
that countervailing duties, like other tariff measures, may extract economic rents 
from foreign producers, the utility of countervailing duties—or any duties, for that 
purpose—is an outcome of the monopsony power of large importing countries.  
Subsidization abroad only is a self-regarding pretense for the exercise of monopsony 
power to impose the optimal tariff.  See id. at 250–56. 
 192. See id. at 263. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009  8:57 AM 
2010] PITFALLS OF THE (PERFECT) MARKET BENCHMARK 49 
protection of the environment, and national security.193  
Moreover, international trade policy is not an outcome of a 
rational policy-making process conducted by a political body 
whose sole concern is the welfare—economic or otherwise—of 
the country as a whole.  Rather, it is more of an outcome of a 
policy-making process in which various political factions looking 
out for their own interests compete against one another.  In this 
world, best described by public-choice theories,194 countervailing 
duty law as it exists may only reflect the interests of the group 
that dominates the legislative process, not net national 
interests. 
Whether or not countervailing duty law is an intended 
outcome of the political process, it could be described as a law 
protecting the interests, or entitlement, of domestic producers.  
Under this so-called entitlement theory or entitlement model of 
countervailing duty law, the goal of countervailing duty law is to 
shield domestic producers from the adverse effects of foreign 
subsidization.195  The entitlement theory focuses on trade 
effects, instead of efficiency effects, of foreign subsidies.  A 
foreign subsidy will be countervailed as long as it adversely 
affects domestic producers, even if it leads to enhanced 
efficiency in the world market and the imposition of 
countervailing duties hurts the importing country as a whole.  
Under the entitlement theory, not all foreign subsidies will be 
countervailed.  A foreign subsidy will be countervailed only if it 
lowers foreign producers’ marginal costs of production and thus 
increases their exports at the expense of domestic producers.196 
If entitlement protection is the true purpose of 
countervailing duty law, it is certainly odd for the centerpiece of 
countervailing duty law—the subsidy benchmarks—to be 
 
 193. Article XX of the GATT allows certain restrictions on international trade 
based on non-efficiency concerns, such as protection of public morals and protection 
of human, animal or plant life and health.  GATT, supra note 31, at 262.  Article XXI 
of the GATT allows international trade restrictions related to national security.  Id. 
at 266. 
 194. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962). 
 195. See Diamond, Economic and Financial Principles, supra note 186; 
Diamond, Foundations, supra note 186; Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 186; 
Gene M. Grossman & Petros C. Mavroidis, United States—Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel 
Products Originating in the United Kingdom: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? 
Privatization and the Injury Caused by Non-Recurring Subsidies, in THE WTO CASE 
LAW OF 2001: THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE REPORTERS’ STUDIES 170 (Henrik Horn 
& Petros C. Mavroidis eds. 2001). 
 196. See, e.g., Diamond, Foundations, supra note 186, at 778–811. 
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ostensibly tied to efficiency, something that in many cases is 
contrary to the goal of entitlement protection.  As discussed 
above, the entitlement model calls for the protection of domestic 
producers even if the subsidies from which domestic producers 
are protected are indeed efficiency-enhancing.  Furthermore, 
protecting domestic producers in the form of countervailing 
duties introduces economic distortions of its own. 
In sum, the search for the undistorted market, which has 
been a central issue in so many high-profile countervailing duty 
cases, does not necessarily fit the purpose of countervailing duty 
law in the first instance.  For countervailing duty law, the fact 
that the search for the undistorted market cannot replicate the 
true undistorted market is certainly damaging, but the fact that 
the search for the undistorted market is not needed at all is 
fatal. 
D.  SUGGESTIONS FOR AVOIDING PITFALLS 
As discussed above, the market benchmark analysis as 
currently formulated under countervailing duty law is replete 
with pitfalls.  But there are some ways of avoiding them. 
First, countervailing duty law should make it more difficult 
for investigating authorities to reject in-country markets as 
distorted.  Rather than allowing investigating authorities to 
engage in circular reasoning in their market distortion 
analysis,197 countervailing duty law should require investigating 
authorities to demonstrate more than the fact that the 
government is the dominant player in the market in question.  
Independent evidence should be required to demonstrate that 
the prevailing market prices in the country under investigation 
would be different absent the government action in question.198  
Essentially, this calls for abandoning the assumption that 
governments set out to price differently than markets whenever 
they participate or intervene in markets. 
Second, if independent evidence does indicate that the 
market in the country under investigation is distorted, or the 
 
 197. See supra Part IV.A. 
 198. One strong, albeit non-conclusive, piece of evidence of government 
distortion of market prices would be internal government documents, which indicate 
that the goal of the government program in question is to change prevailing market 
price.  Another possible piece of evidence of government distortion is data showing 
changes in the market price after the government’s entry into the market.  
Admittedly, independent evidence of government distortion of market may not exist 
in certain scenarios.  If that is the case, the presumption should be no finding of 
market distortion, rather than the other way around. 
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government is the sole provider of a good or service in a market, 
countervailing duty law should limit the alternative 
benchmarks to which investigating authorities will be allowed 
to resort.  Specifically, countervailing duty law should outlaw 
the use of out-of-country benchmarks, which, as shown in this 
Article, are incapable of achieving what they are set out to 
achieve, i.e., replication of market prices that would prevail but 
for government subsidies. 
One possible alternative benchmark that could be adopted 
by investigating authorities is the costs to the government (or, 
in the case of private entities being entrusted or directed by the 
government to provide subsidies, the costs to the private 
providers) of providing the subsidies in question.  In the 
preamble to the 1998 countervailing duty regulations, the DOC 
already lists costs as one of the factors that it will consider in 
assessing subsidies when the government is the sole provider of 
a good or service.199  The main advantage of using costs as the 
subsidy benchmark is that they are objective—unlike 
hypothetical prices constructed by out-of-country benchmarks, 
costs are gleaned from real-world data and can be reasonably 
ascertained by producers assessing their potential 
countervailing duty liabilities.200  By requiring either the use of 
in-country prices or in-country costs as subsidy benchmarks, 
this reform essentially calls for the abandonment of the 
undistorted market approach. 
If implemented properly, these two reform measures will 
enable countervailing duty law to navigate around the pitfalls 
associated with the undistorted market benchmark.  Given that 
the undistorted market benchmark is not necessary for 
countervailing duty law, or in some cases even runs counter to 
it, its abandonment certainly does not contradict that law’s 
purposes. 
In addition, the abandonment of the undistorted market 
benchmark has important collateral benefits in terms of 
economic efficiency.  As analyzed above, the undistorted-market 
 
 199. Preamble to 1998 Countervailing Duty Regulations, supra note 80, at 
65,378 (“Where the government is the sole provider of a good or service . . . we will 
assess whether the government price was set in accordance with market principles 
through an analysis of such factors as . . . costs (including rates of return sufficient 
to ensure future operations) . . . .”). 
 200. One potential drawback of using costs as the subsidy benchmark, however, 
is that costs may suffer from the same valuation concern that plagues the subsidy 
inquiry in the first place, if the government is a dominant player in the input 
markets for the constituting elements of costs.  In-depth analysis of this issue is not 
within the scope of this Article and is better dealt with by future research. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009  8:57 AM 
52 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol. 19:1 
approach currently espoused by the market benchmark analysis 
in countervailing duty law allows investigating authorities to 
reject in-country market benchmarks and resort to out-of-
country benchmarks if they simply assert that the in-country 
market is distorted.  Equipped with this almost unbridled 
discretion, investigating authorities operating under the 
pressure of domestic interests will be tempted to resort to 
economically unsound methodologies resulting in larger 
countervailing duty margins.  Elimination of such discretion is 
expected to result in smaller countervailing duty margins, 
which will in turn result in less economic distortion. 
Finally, the abandonment of the undistorted market 
benchmark will remove one of the greatest uncertainties in the 
application of countervailing duty law.  One of the major goals of 
international trade organizations, including the WTO, is to 
create a transparent and predictable trade environment so that 
firms can plan their production and sales activities with a 
relatively high degree of certainty.  In countervailing duty law, 
however, many uncertainties have been created by the 
undistorted-market approach to the market benchmark 
analysis.  Although the WTO rules lay out a definition of 
subsidy, it is far from clear that firms and governments are able 
to predict whether their actions will or will not be treated as 
subsidies.  They are not able to look to the prices prevailing in 
the private market in their own country as definitive guidance 
because the in-country private market may be considered 
distorted and thus its prices unsuitable as subsidy benchmarks.  
They are not able to look to prices prevailing in other countries 
as definitive guidance either because it is impossible to predict 
which country’s prices will be selected as subsidy benchmarks.  
By forcing investigating authorities to accept either in-country 
prices or in-country costs as the subsidy benchmark, the reform 
measures will go a long way toward promoting certainty. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrates that in countervailing duty law, 
the market benchmark has won out against the preferentiality 
benchmark to become the favored benchmark for identifying 
and measuring subsidies.  Efficiency is the offered justification 
for a market benchmark analysis.  Markets, it is said, provide a 
measure of maximum economic efficiency.  Therefore, 
countervailing subsidies identified and measured through 
comparison to the market benchmark enhance economic 
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efficiency. 
This Article further demonstrates that the market 
benchmark analysis as currently formulated in countervailing 
duty law envisions an undistorted, perfect market and grants 
wide discretion to the DOC in its search for this perfect market.  
Exercising this discretion, the DOC has liberally rejected in-
country prices on grounds of market distortion and has 
consistently resorted to out-of-country prices as alternative 
subsidy benchmarks.  Both practices, however, lack support in 
economic theories and empirical evidence.  As a result, the 
alternative benchmarks selected by the DOC cannot be a 
reliable proxy for the prices that would arise in an undistorted 
market absent government subsidies.  Even if this undistorted 
market could somehow be replicated, there is no guarantee that 
it will represent maximum economic efficiency, due to the 
possibility of market failures.  Finally, this Article demonstrates 
that the fatal pitfall of the market benchmark analysis in 
countervailing duty law is that the ostensible purpose of the 
undistorted market benchmark—economic efficiency—is not the 
purpose of countervailing duty law itself. 
It is important to bear in mind that countervailing duty law 
is only one of the many areas of law that use markets as a 
benchmark for economic value.  The answer given by 
countervailing duty law to the question of what type of market 
should be used in the market benchmark may not be 
representative of the answers given by other areas of law.  At 
least one other area of law has given an opposite answer to this 
question, albeit in a different setting.201  Still, the lessons 
learned from the countervailing duty law may offer valuable 
insights for other areas of law, especially when there is a 
temptation to opt for a perfect yet hypothetical market over an 
imperfect yet real market as the benchmark for economic value.  
Countervailing duty law teaches us that when faced with such a 
choice, it is crucial to evaluate the purpose of the law in 
 
 201. Under the federal bankruptcy code, a bankruptcy trustee can avoid certain 
pre-petition transfers of the debtor’s property as fraudulent if the debtor received 
“less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange.”  11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) 
(2000).  A question arises as to whether the price a transferee paid at a non-
collusive, regularly scheduled judicial foreclosure sale is the “reasonably equivalent 
value” of the property.  The foreclosure market, by its very nature, is a market under 
distress and is not perfect in that sense.  In  BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 
531 (1994), the United States Supreme Court holds that the foreclosure price, 
although lower than in a normal market, constitutes a reasonably equivalent value 
of the property.  This essentially calls for the use of a market-as-is benchmark over a 
perfect-market benchmark for the purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B). 
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question before deciding which type of market best suits that 
purpose.  It is also important to bear in mind that even if a 
perfect market happens to be the most suitable benchmark in 
light of the purpose of the law, the search for that perfect 
market may not yield any valid results, as in the case of 
countervailing duty law. 
